From fc4e1c75ed884b25fcf672283154296812310616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: alvis <allogn@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 04:40:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] agap-mcp: authenticate the :3100 listener (kb#180), pin bw
 CLI, add capture/classifier
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Listener auth (kb#180, DESIGN-a2a-agents.md §4)
-----------------------------------------------
agap-mcp binds :3100 on every interface (network_mode: host) and the LAN
carries VPN-terminated peers, so an unauthenticated JSON-RPC listener handed
ha_call_service / gitea_wiki_write / wiki_edit / radicale+todoist writes and
POST /capture-idea to any LAN peer. Only vw_* was gated before (kb#147), and
only at ENFORCE=1.

src/listener-auth.js now requires `Authorization: Bearer <token>` resolving to
a known agent id on every route except /health, which stays open so a
misconfigured token map is still diagnosable. Two gates stay deliberately
layered and independently switchable: "are you an agent at all?" (this file)
vs "are you trusted enough for the vault?" (trust-gate.js), both reading the
same token map.

Also closes an SSE session-hijack hole: /messages previously trusted any
sessionId with no credential, so a guessed or leaked id was full tool access.
Sessions are now pinned to the caller identity captured at the /sse handshake,
comparing agent id *and* token.

Auth defaults ON, and boot fails loudly if the token map is empty rather than
serving 401 to everyone while /health reports ok. Rollback is
AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH=0.

Verified live: unauthenticated and bad-token /mcp -> 401, unauthenticated
/capture-idea -> 401, /health -> 200, both real agent tokens -> 200 with 36
tools, including from inside the adolf container.

Pin the bw CLI
--------------
The Dockerfile installed @bitwarden/cli unpinned. Rebuilding jumped
2026.2.0 -> 2026.7.0, whose WASM cipher deserializer rejects any stored login
carrying `"uri": null` ("invalid type: JsValue(Object({...})), expected a
string") -- 33 of 49 items in this vault have that shape. `bw list` then exits
1, server init fails, and the container crash-loops. Pinned to 2026.2.0.

Do not unpin: 2026.7.0 cannot authenticate against this Vaultwarden
(2025.12.0) at all -- it refuses plain HTTP outright and 404s on the identity
endpoint over HTTPS. Updating the CLI requires upgrading Vaultwarden first.

capture / classifier
--------------------
Adds the POST /capture-idea REST endpoint and the idea classifier behind it
(consumed by the todoist-capture plugin), with tests. Carried in the same
commit because server.js wires both this and the auth boot path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 agap-mcp/Dockerfile                   |   9 +-
 agap-mcp/docker-compose.yml           |  31 +++
 agap-mcp/src/capture.js               |  58 ++++
 agap-mcp/src/capture.test.mjs         |  84 ++++++
 agap-mcp/src/classifier.js            | 228 ++++++++++++++++
 agap-mcp/src/classifier.test.mjs      |  45 +++
 agap-mcp/src/gitea.js                 |  28 +-
 agap-mcp/src/listener-auth.js         | 147 ++++++++++
 agap-mcp/src/server.js                | 142 +++++++++-
 agap-mcp/src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs | 376 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 agap-mcp/src/trust-gate.js            |  20 +-
 11 files changed, 1089 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 agap-mcp/src/capture.js
 create mode 100644 agap-mcp/src/capture.test.mjs
 create mode 100644 agap-mcp/src/classifier.js
 create mode 100644 agap-mcp/src/classifier.test.mjs
 create mode 100644 agap-mcp/src/listener-auth.js

diff --git a/agap-mcp/Dockerfile b/agap-mcp/Dockerfile
index 07c26e4..36fb8b8 100644
--- a/agap-mcp/Dockerfile
+++ b/agap-mcp/Dockerfile
@@ -5,7 +5,14 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 WORKDIR /app
-RUN npm install -g @bitwarden/cli
+# PINNED — do not float this back to `@bitwarden/cli` (kb#180, 2026-07-30).
+# An unpinned rebuild pulled 2026.7.0, whose WASM cipher deserializer rejects
+# any stored login object with `"uri": null` ("invalid type: JsValue(Object({...})),
+# expected a string") — the MATRIX_ADOLF_GATEWAY_TOKEN item in this vault has
+# exactly that shape. `bw list` then exits 1, server.js's init fails, and the
+# container crash-loops on restart. 2026.2.0 parses that item fine and is the
+# version the host CLI runs. Re-test against the live vault before bumping.
+RUN npm install -g @bitwarden/cli@2026.2.0
 COPY package.json ./
 RUN npm install --production
 COPY src/ ./src/
diff --git a/agap-mcp/docker-compose.yml b/agap-mcp/docker-compose.yml
index 107eb8b..4f75eb3 100644
--- a/agap-mcp/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/agap-mcp/docker-compose.yml
@@ -36,9 +36,40 @@ services:
       # inlined in this committed file. Empty object = no caller resolves to
       # any agent, i.e. fail-closed once ENFORCE is turned on.
       - AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS=${AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS:-{}}
+      # kb#180 (DESIGN-a2a-agents.md §4) — authentication of the LISTENER
+      # itself, a strictly larger gate than the vw_*-only one above. With
+      # this on (the default in code), /mcp, /sse, /messages and
+      # /capture-idea all require `Authorization: Bearer <token>` resolving
+      # to an agent id in AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS; /health stays open for this
+      # healthcheck. :3100 is bound on every interface (network_mode: host)
+      # and the LAN carries VPN-terminated peers, so an open listener means
+      # any peer can call ha_call_service / gitea_wiki_write / wiki_edit /
+      # todoist writes.
+      #
+      # ACTIVATION IS NOT AUTOMATIC-SAFE: with auth on and
+      # AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS empty, the process REFUSES TO START (loud
+      # crash instead of denying every caller while /health says ok). So
+      # AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS must be populated in this directory's .env
+      # BEFORE the next restart of this service, and every caller
+      # (Adolf/shared-mcp.json, Claude Code .claude.json, the
+      # todoist-capture-plugin) must be given its token — see the kb#180
+      # migration list. Set AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH=0 in .env only as a
+      # deliberate emergency rollback to the old open listener.
+      - AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH=${AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH:-1}
     volumes:
       - /home/alvis/.config/Bitwarden CLI:/bw-data
       # Read-only: agent-registry.yaml is the version-controlled source of
       # truth for trust classes (kb#134/kb#147) — mounted, never copied, so
       # a registry edit takes effect on container restart with no rebuild.
       - /home/alvis/agap_git/openai/agent-registry.yaml:/agent-registry.yaml:ro
+    # kb#190: /health responds 200 with no auth/side effects (confirmed).
+    # This is a SEPARATE compose project from openai/docker-compose.yml
+    # (network_mode: host, reached from adolf-llm etc. via
+    # host.docker.internal), so it cannot be wired into that file's
+    # depends_on/condition chain -- this only gives it its own status.
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "node -e \"fetch('http://localhost:3100/health').then(r=>process.exit(r.ok?0:1)).catch(()=>process.exit(1))\""]
+      interval: 15s
+      timeout: 10s
+      retries: 5
+      start_period: 20s
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/capture.js b/agap-mcp/src/capture.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f462f8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/capture.js
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// Idea capture pipeline (kb#170): classify -> Todoist task.
+//
+// Deliberately does NOT create/move anything in Kanboard, Radicale, or
+// gitea — kb#170 component 4 ("Adolf предлагает, какие идеи созрели")
+// is a human-in-the-loop periodic review, not an automatic conversion.
+// This module only tags the idea so that later review has something to
+// act on (labels: area-*, urgency-*, and "decompose" when flagged).
+//
+// Project/label mapping is a deliberate v1 decision, not a guess left
+// unstated: Todoist's real projects today (Inbox, One-Off, Family,
+// Planning, Pending — confirmed live via todoist_list_projects) don't
+// line up with the 5 kb#170 areas except "семья" ~= "Family". Creating
+// four new Todoist projects to match Adolf/Welfare/дом/здоровье is a
+// structural change to the user's real Todoist account, so it is NOT done
+// here without explicit sign-off — see kb#170 report. Instead every idea
+// keeps its default project (Inbox, unless the caller passes one) and
+// gets an `area-*` label, which is purely additive/reversible (Todoist
+// auto-creates labels on first use, and any label can be deleted later
+// with zero data loss).
+import { classifyIdea } from './classifier.js';
+import { todoistCreateTask } from './todoist.js';
+
+const FAMILY_PROJECT_NAME = 'Family';
+
+// urgency label -> Todoist API priority (1=normal..4=urgent, inverse of
+// the Todoist UI's p1..p4 — see todoist.js header comment).
+const URGENCY_TO_PRIORITY = { high: 4, medium: 2, low: 1 };
+
+export async function todoistCaptureIdea({ text, project_id } = {}, { listProjects = null, createTask = todoistCreateTask } = {}) {
+  if (!text || !text.trim()) throw new Error('text is required');
+
+  const classification = await classifyIdea(text.trim());
+
+  const labels = [`area-${classification.area.label}`, `urgency-${classification.urgency.label}`];
+  if (classification.decompose.label === 'needs-decomposition') labels.push('decompose');
+  if (classification.area.ambiguous) labels.push('area-uncertain');
+
+  // Only auto-route to an existing project when it's an unambiguous, exact
+  // match (семья -> Family) — never invent/select a project the classifier
+  // merely guessed at, and never override a project_id the caller passed
+  // explicitly.
+  let resolvedProjectId = project_id;
+  if (!resolvedProjectId && classification.area.label === 'семья' && !classification.area.ambiguous && typeof listProjects === 'function') {
+    const projects = await listProjects();
+    const family = projects.find((p) => p.name === FAMILY_PROJECT_NAME);
+    if (family) resolvedProjectId = family.id;
+  }
+
+  const task = await createTask({
+    content: text.trim(),
+    description: `Захвачено через AI-классификацию (kb#170): area=${classification.area.label} (${classification.area.score}), urgency=${classification.urgency.label} (${classification.urgency.score}), decompose=${classification.decompose.label} (${classification.decompose.score}).`,
+    priority: URGENCY_TO_PRIORITY[classification.urgency.label],
+    project_id: resolvedProjectId,
+    labels,
+  });
+
+  return { task, classification };
+}
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/capture.test.mjs b/agap-mcp/src/capture.test.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87b3489
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/capture.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+// Proof for kb#170 capture pipeline (classify -> Todoist task shape),
+// run with:
+//   BGE_M3_URL=http://localhost:11436/v1/embeddings node src/capture.test.mjs
+//
+// Deliberately stubs createTask/listProjects instead of calling the real
+// Todoist API — this proves the classify -> label/priority/project mapping
+// logic without writing test data into the user's live Todoist account
+// (kb#170 report: no live Todoist writes were made while proving this out).
+
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { todoistCaptureIdea } from './capture.js';
+
+let passed = 0;
+function check(label, fn) {
+  fn();
+  passed++;
+  console.log(`ok - ${label}`);
+}
+
+const projects = [
+  { id: '6CrfPQ8FXxf5ghrx', name: 'Inbox', is_inbox: true },
+  { id: '6cg4j8CX3vj7H9rJ', name: 'Family' },
+];
+
+function makeStubCreateTask() {
+  const calls = [];
+  const createTask = async (args) => {
+    calls.push(args);
+    return { id: 'stub-1', content: args.content, project_id: args.project_id, priority: args.priority, labels: args.labels };
+  };
+  return { createTask, calls };
+}
+
+const { createTask: createTaskFamily, calls: callsFamily } = makeStubCreateTask();
+const familyResult = await todoistCaptureIdea(
+  { text: 'позвонить маме поздравить с днём рождения' },
+  { listProjects: async () => projects, createTask: createTaskFamily }
+);
+
+check('семья idea auto-routes to the existing Family project', () => {
+  assert.equal(familyResult.classification.area.label, 'семья');
+  assert.equal(callsFamily[0].project_id, '6cg4j8CX3vj7H9rJ');
+});
+
+check('семья idea is labelled area-семья + urgency-*', () => {
+  assert.ok(callsFamily[0].labels.includes('area-семья'));
+  assert.ok(callsFamily[0].labels.some((l) => l.startsWith('urgency-')));
+});
+
+const { createTask: createTaskUrgent, calls: callsUrgent } = makeStubCreateTask();
+await todoistCaptureIdea(
+  { text: 'починить квоту Kimi у Adolf, срочно сегодня' },
+  { listProjects: async () => projects, createTask: createTaskUrgent }
+);
+
+check('high-urgency idea gets Todoist priority 4 (urgent)', () => {
+  assert.equal(callsUrgent[0].priority, 4);
+});
+
+check('adolf-area idea is NOT auto-routed to a project (no matching project exists)', () => {
+  assert.equal(callsUrgent[0].project_id, undefined);
+});
+
+const { createTask: createTaskProject, calls: callsProject } = makeStubCreateTask();
+await todoistCaptureIdea(
+  { text: 'купить новый пылесос для дома', project_id: 'explicit-override' },
+  { listProjects: async () => projects, createTask: createTaskProject }
+);
+
+check('an explicit project_id always wins over auto-routing', () => {
+  assert.equal(callsProject[0].project_id, 'explicit-override');
+});
+
+const { createTask: createTaskDecompose, calls: callsDecompose } = makeStubCreateTask();
+await todoistCaptureIdea(
+  { text: 'спроектировать и запустить proactive-секретаря на Agap' },
+  { listProjects: async () => projects, createTask: createTaskDecompose }
+);
+
+check('a multi-step idea gets the "decompose" label', () => {
+  assert.ok(callsDecompose[0].labels.includes('decompose'));
+});
+
+console.log(`\n${passed} passed`);
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/classifier.js b/agap-mcp/src/classifier.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dd1fe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/classifier.js
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+// Todoist idea classifier (kb#170, component 2) — encoder-only, NOT a
+// classifier LLM call. Per DESIGN-a2a-agents.md v2.1 §3a/§3.1/theorem 24:
+// "routing classification is embedding-based on the local bge-m3 ... no
+// classifier LLM, no API spend". This module applies that same idea to
+// Todoist-capture classification: embed the idea text with bge-m3 (already
+// GPU-resident, never-evict per model-registry.yaml) and classify by
+// nearest-centroid against a small hand-labelled exemplar set — no Kimi/
+// gemma call, ~0 marginal cost, no metered API.
+//
+// Three independent classification axes (each idea gets one label per axis,
+// not a single combined class):
+//   area        — which part of life the idea belongs to (kb#170 spec)
+//   urgency     — how soon it stops being actionable
+//   decompose   — is this a single atomic action, or a multi-step project
+//                 that should eventually become a Kanboard task graph
+//
+// This is deliberately a NEAREST-CENTROID classifier, not a trained model:
+// no labelled training set exists (kb#170 orchestrator note — inventing one
+// would be guessing), so the "training data" IS the exemplar list below,
+// reviewed/editable in code (git-controlled, per DESIGN-a2a-agents.md
+// "Personas and Cards are code"). Extending accuracy later means adding
+// exemplars here, not retraining a model.
+
+const DEFAULT_BGE_URL = process.env.BGE_M3_URL || 'http://host.docker.internal:11436/v1/embeddings';
+
+// --- Exemplars -------------------------------------------------------------
+// Kept short and idiomatic (the kind of one-line idea a person actually
+// captures), Russian-first since that's the capture language (kb#170 desc).
+// Centroids are the mean of these exemplars' embeddings — adding more
+// exemplars per class only requires appending strings here.
+
+const AREA_EXEMPLARS = {
+  adolf: [
+    'починить квоту Kimi у Adolf',
+    'настроить cron задачу в Kanboard',
+    'добавить новую MCP команду',
+    'проверить логи agap-mcp контейнера',
+    'написать воркер для очереди задач',
+    'обновить конфиг openclaw.json',
+  ],
+  welfare: [
+    'продумать еженедельный ревью задач',
+    'настроить трекер настроения и энергии',
+    'сделать ежедневный брифинг по утрам',
+    'завести журнал решений',
+    'придумать систему напоминаний о важных вещах',
+    'разобраться с личной продуктивностью',
+    'спроектировать proactive-секретаря для себя',
+    'построить систему, которая сама напоминает и планирует',
+    'придумать, как автоматизировать личный распорядок дня',
+  ],
+  'дом': [
+    'купить новый пылесос',
+    'почистить фильтр кондиционера',
+    'вызвать сантехника починить кран',
+    'заказать доставку воды',
+    'разобрать кладовку',
+    'поменять лампочку в коридоре',
+    'оплатить счёт за квартиру',
+    'оплатить интернет и коммуналку',
+  ],
+  'семья': [
+    'позвонить маме',
+    'поздравить сестру с днём рождения',
+    'купить подарок жене',
+    'спланировать поездку с семьёй',
+    'написать бабушке',
+    'забрать детей из школы',
+  ],
+  'здоровье': [
+    'записаться к врачу',
+    'сдать анализы крови',
+    'начать бегать по утрам',
+    'купить витамины',
+    'сходить к стоматологу',
+    'записаться на массаж',
+  ],
+};
+
+const URGENCY_EXEMPLARS = {
+  high: [
+    'сделать это сегодня, срочно',
+    'дедлайн завтра утром',
+    'оплатить штраф до пятницы, иначе пени',
+    'нужно решить прямо сейчас',
+  ],
+  medium: [
+    'сделать на этой неделе',
+    'стоит сделать в ближайшие дни',
+    'через пару дней надо разобраться',
+    'неплохо бы успеть до конца месяца',
+  ],
+  low: [
+    'когда-нибудь было бы неплохо',
+    'не к спеху, просто идея на будущее',
+    'если будет время',
+    'мысль про потом, без срока',
+  ],
+};
+
+const DECOMPOSE_EXEMPLARS = {
+  'needs-decomposition': [
+    'организовать переезд на новую квартиру',
+    'спроектировать и запустить новый сервис на сервере',
+    'спланировать отпуск в другую страну',
+    'построить систему проактивного секретаря',
+    'провести ремонт в квартире',
+    'подготовить и провести презентацию проекта',
+  ],
+  'simple-task': [
+    'позвонить маме',
+    'купить хлеб',
+    'оплатить счёт за интернет',
+    'отправить один email',
+    'поставить будильник',
+    'записать одну мысль в заметки',
+  ],
+};
+
+// --- Embeddings + cosine similarity -----------------------------------------
+
+async function embed(text, bgeUrl = DEFAULT_BGE_URL) {
+  const res = await fetch(bgeUrl, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ model: 'bge-m3', input: text }),
+  });
+  if (!res.ok) {
+    throw new Error(`bge-m3 embeddings ${res.status}: ${(await res.text()).slice(0, 300)}`);
+  }
+  const body = await res.json();
+  const vec = body?.data?.[0]?.embedding;
+  if (!Array.isArray(vec)) throw new Error('bge-m3 embeddings: no vector in response');
+  return vec;
+}
+
+function dot(a, b) {
+  let s = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) s += a[i] * b[i];
+  return s;
+}
+
+function norm(a) {
+  return Math.sqrt(dot(a, a));
+}
+
+function normalize(a) {
+  const n = norm(a) || 1;
+  return a.map((x) => x / n);
+}
+
+function mean(vectors) {
+  const dim = vectors[0].length;
+  const out = new Array(dim).fill(0);
+  for (const v of vectors) for (let i = 0; i < dim; i++) out[i] += v[i];
+  return out.map((x) => x / vectors.length);
+}
+
+function cosine(a, b) {
+  return dot(a, b) / ((norm(a) || 1) * (norm(b) || 1));
+}
+
+// --- Centroid cache ----------------------------------------------------------
+// Computed once per process (exemplars are static, embedding a few dozen
+// short strings at startup is cheap and happens lazily on first classify()
+// call, not at import time — keeps agap-mcp's init() path unaffected).
+
+let _centroidsPromise = null;
+
+async function buildCentroidSet(exemplarMap, bgeUrl) {
+  const labels = Object.keys(exemplarMap);
+  const centroids = {};
+  for (const label of labels) {
+    const vectors = await Promise.all(exemplarMap[label].map((t) => embed(t, bgeUrl).then(normalize)));
+    centroids[label] = normalize(mean(vectors));
+  }
+  return centroids;
+}
+
+async function getCentroids(bgeUrl = DEFAULT_BGE_URL) {
+  if (!_centroidsPromise) {
+    _centroidsPromise = Promise.all([
+      buildCentroidSet(AREA_EXEMPLARS, bgeUrl),
+      buildCentroidSet(URGENCY_EXEMPLARS, bgeUrl),
+      buildCentroidSet(DECOMPOSE_EXEMPLARS, bgeUrl),
+    ]).then(([area, urgency, decompose]) => ({ area, urgency, decompose }));
+  }
+  return _centroidsPromise;
+}
+
+// Test-only: let tests reset the cache (e.g. to inject a different BGE_URL).
+export function _resetCentroidCacheForTests() {
+  _centroidsPromise = null;
+}
+
+// nearestLabel: pick argmax cosine similarity; also report the runner-up
+// and the margin between them. A small margin means the idea sits between
+// two classes — surfaced as `ambiguous: true` rather than silently forced,
+// so the periodic-review pass (kb#170 component 4) can have Adolf confirm
+// instead of trusting a low-confidence auto-tag.
+function nearestLabel(vec, centroidMap) {
+  const scored = Object.entries(centroidMap)
+    .map(([label, centroid]) => ({ label, score: cosine(vec, centroid) }))
+    .sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score);
+  const [top, second] = scored;
+  const margin = second ? top.score - second.score : 1;
+  return {
+    label: top.label,
+    score: Number(top.score.toFixed(4)),
+    margin: Number(margin.toFixed(4)),
+    ambiguous: margin < 0.03, // empirical starting threshold — revisit once real captures accumulate (same posture as DESIGN-proactive-prioritization.md's tunable constants)
+  };
+}
+
+// classify: the one entry point. Embeds the idea text ONCE, reuses it
+// across all three axes (one bge-m3 call, not three) — consistent with
+// the "no metered/needless calls" cost discipline in DESIGN-a2a-agents.md.
+export async function classifyIdea(text, { bgeUrl = DEFAULT_BGE_URL } = {}) {
+  if (!text || !text.trim()) throw new Error('text is required');
+  const [vec, centroids] = await Promise.all([embed(text, bgeUrl).then(normalize), getCentroids(bgeUrl)]);
+  return {
+    area: nearestLabel(vec, centroids.area),
+    urgency: nearestLabel(vec, centroids.urgency),
+    decompose: nearestLabel(vec, centroids.decompose),
+  };
+}
+
+export const _internal = { AREA_EXEMPLARS, URGENCY_EXEMPLARS, DECOMPOSE_EXEMPLARS, cosine, embed, getCentroids };
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/classifier.test.mjs b/agap-mcp/src/classifier.test.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba5dbca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/classifier.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// Proof for kb#170 component 2 — run with:
+//   BGE_M3_URL=http://localhost:11436/v1/embeddings node src/classifier.test.mjs
+// (default BGE_M3_URL assumes host.docker.internal, which only resolves
+// inside a container; override to localhost when running on the Agap host
+// directly, same pattern as the bge-m3 curl checks elsewhere in this repo).
+//
+// This is a LIVE test against the real bge-m3 embedder (no mock) — the
+// point of an encoder-only classifier is that it's cheap enough to just
+// call for real (~30 short strings embedded once, then one embedding per
+// test case). It does not touch Todoist, Kanboard, or any other live
+// service.
+
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { classifyIdea } from './classifier.js';
+
+const cases = [
+  { text: 'позвонить маме поздравить с днём рождения', expectArea: 'семья' },
+  { text: 'купить новый пылесос для дома', expectArea: 'дом' },
+  { text: 'записаться на приём к стоматологу', expectArea: 'здоровье' },
+  { text: 'починить квоту Kimi у Adolf, срочно сегодня', expectArea: 'adolf', expectUrgency: 'high' },
+  { text: 'спроектировать и запустить proactive-секретаря на Agap', expectArea: 'welfare', expectDecompose: 'needs-decomposition' },
+  { text: 'оплатить счёт за интернет', expectDecompose: 'simple-task' },
+  { text: 'организовать переезд на новую квартиру, когда-нибудь', expectDecompose: 'needs-decomposition', expectUrgency: 'low' },
+];
+
+let passed = 0;
+let failed = 0;
+
+for (const c of cases) {
+  const result = await classifyIdea(c.text);
+  const row = `"${c.text}" -> area=${result.area.label}(${result.area.score}) urgency=${result.urgency.label}(${result.urgency.score}) decompose=${result.decompose.label}(${result.decompose.score})`;
+  try {
+    if (c.expectArea) assert.equal(result.area.label, c.expectArea, `area mismatch for "${c.text}"`);
+    if (c.expectUrgency) assert.equal(result.urgency.label, c.expectUrgency, `urgency mismatch for "${c.text}"`);
+    if (c.expectDecompose) assert.equal(result.decompose.label, c.expectDecompose, `decompose mismatch for "${c.text}"`);
+    console.log(`ok   - ${row}`);
+    passed++;
+  } catch (e) {
+    console.log(`FAIL - ${row}\n       ${e.message}`);
+    failed++;
+  }
+}
+
+console.log(`\n${passed} passed, ${failed} failed`);
+if (failed > 0) process.exit(1);
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/gitea.js b/agap-mcp/src/gitea.js
index 1a074ff..f021678 100644
--- a/agap-mcp/src/gitea.js
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/gitea.js
@@ -3,6 +3,20 @@ import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs';
 import { tmpdir } from 'os';
 import { join } from 'path';
 
+// Askpass helper: git invokes this script (path is what shows up in ps/args),
+// and it reads the actual token from an env var — never from argv or the URL.
+// This keeps the token out of the process table and out of any git error text.
+let _askpassPath = null;
+function askpassScript() {
+  if (_askpassPath) return _askpassPath;
+  const dir = join(tmpdir(), 'agap-mcp-wiki');
+  mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+  const scriptPath = join(dir, 'git-askpass.sh');
+  writeFileSync(scriptPath, '#!/bin/sh\nprintf %s "$GITEA_ASKPASS_TOKEN"\n', { mode: 0o700 });
+  _askpassPath = scriptPath;
+  return scriptPath;
+}
+
 const BASE = () => process.env.GITEA_URL || 'http://localhost:3000';
 let _token = null;
 
@@ -48,9 +62,19 @@ export async function giteaWikiRead(page, repo = 'alvis/AgapHost') {
 
 export async function giteaWikiWrite(page, content, message, repo = 'alvis/AgapHost') {
   const dir = join(tmpdir(), 'agap-mcp-wiki');
-  const wikiUrl = `${BASE().replace('http://', `http://alvis:${token()}@`)}/alvis/AgapHost.wiki.git`;
+  // Username in the URL is not secret; the password/token is supplied out-of-band
+  // via GIT_ASKPASS + GITEA_ASKPASS_TOKEN, so it never appears in the URL, the
+  // execSync command string, ps/process args, or surfaced git error output.
+  const wikiUrl = `${BASE().replace('http://', 'http://alvis@')}/alvis/AgapHost.wiki.git`;
 
-  const gitEnv = { ...process.env, GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: 'agap-mcp', GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL: 'allogn@gmail.com', GIT_COMMITTER_NAME: 'agap-mcp', GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL: 'allogn@gmail.com' };
+  const gitEnv = {
+    ...process.env,
+    GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: 'agap-mcp', GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL: 'allogn@gmail.com',
+    GIT_COMMITTER_NAME: 'agap-mcp', GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL: 'allogn@gmail.com',
+    GIT_ASKPASS: askpassScript(),
+    GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0',
+    GITEA_ASKPASS_TOKEN: token(),
+  };
 
   try {
     execSync(`git -C ${dir} pull ${wikiUrl} main`, { env: gitEnv, stdio: 'pipe' });
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/listener-auth.js b/agap-mcp/src/listener-auth.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d8cd76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/listener-auth.js
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+// listener-auth — kb#180: authenticate the agap-mcp :3100 listener itself,
+// not just the vault tools.
+//
+// WHY THIS EXISTS
+// agap-mcp runs `network_mode: host` and binds :3100 on every interface. The
+// LAN is explicitly NOT a trust boundary here — DESIGN-a2a-agents.md v2.1 §4
+// ("Auth is mandatory on every A2A surface. The LAN is not trusted — the
+// xray/3x-ui VPN terminates other people's peers on it. No unauthenticated
+// JSON-RPC listener, ever: shared tokens minimum, mTLS preferred.").
+//
+// Before this module, the ONLY gate in the process was requireVaultAccess()
+// (kb#147), which covers vw_* tools alone and only at ENFORCE=1. Everything
+// else — ha_call_service, gitea_wiki_write, wiki_edit, radicale_*/todoist_*
+// writes, and the plain-REST POST /capture-idea — was callable by any LAN
+// peer with curl. This module closes that: the transport itself now requires
+// a bearer token that resolves to a known agent id.
+//
+// TWO DISTINCT GATES, DELIBERATELY LAYERED
+//   1. listener auth (this file)  — "are you *an* agent at all?"  → any id in
+//      AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS passes; unknown/absent token = 401.
+//   2. vault trust gate (trust-gate.js / requireVaultAccess in server.js)
+//      — "are you trust_class >= trusted?" → only then may vw_* run.
+// Both read the SAME token map, so one token per agent covers both. Gate 2
+// stays independently switchable (AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST) exactly as
+// kb#147 shipped it; turning on gate 1 does not turn on gate 2.
+//
+// FAIL-FAST, NOT FAIL-SILENT
+// Auth is ON by default (AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH != '0'). If it is on and the
+// token map is empty, assertListenerAuthConfig() throws at boot rather than
+// letting the process serve 401 to literally everyone while /health says
+// "ok" — a missing .env value must look like a broken restart, not like a
+// quietly dead integration. See server.js boot path.
+//
+// SSE SESSION BINDING
+// The legacy SSE transport hands out a sessionId at GET /sse and accepts JSON-RPC
+// on POST /messages?sessionId=... . Previously /messages trusted ANY sessionId
+// with no credential — a session-id guess/leak was full tool access (hijack).
+// bindSseSession()/authorizeSseSession() below pin the caller identity captured
+// at handshake to the session, and /messages must present the same agent's
+// token or it is rejected.
+
+import { resolveCallerAgent, authHeaderToken } from './trust-gate.js';
+
+// ON unless explicitly disabled. The opposite default from kb#147's vault gate
+// on purpose: an unauthenticated JSON-RPC listener is the thing §4 forbids
+// outright, so "off" has to be a deliberate, visible opt-out.
+export function requireAuthEnabled(env = process.env) {
+  return env.AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH !== '0';
+}
+
+// Routes that stay open even with auth on:
+//   /health — the compose healthcheck calls it with no credential, it has no
+//   side effects, and it returns only counts/booleans (no secrets, no tool
+//   surface). Keeping it open is what lets a misconfigured token map still be
+//   diagnosable from outside the container.
+export const PUBLIC_PATHS = new Set(['/health']);
+
+export class ListenerAuthConfigError extends Error {}
+
+// Called once at boot from server.js. Throws (crash loudly) instead of
+// booting an all-callers-denied service.
+export function assertListenerAuthConfig(tokenMap, env = process.env) {
+  if (!requireAuthEnabled(env)) {
+    console.error(
+      '\n*** agap-mcp WARNING: AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH=0 — the :3100 MCP listener is ' +
+      'UNAUTHENTICATED. Every tool (ha_call_service, gitea_wiki_write, wiki_edit, ' +
+      'radicale/todoist writes, POST /capture-idea) is callable by any LAN peer, and ' +
+      'the LAN carries VPN-terminated peers. This violates DESIGN-a2a-agents.md §4 ' +
+      'and is only acceptable as a temporary, deliberate rollback (kb#180). ***\n'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+  if (Object.keys(tokenMap || {}).length === 0) {
+    throw new ListenerAuthConfigError(
+      'AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH is on (default) but AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS is empty/unset, ' +
+      'so no caller could ever authenticate. Populate AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS in this ' +
+      "container's .env with a JSON map {\"<bearer-token>\":\"<agent-id>\"} (agent ids " +
+      'must exist in agent-registry.yaml), or set AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH=0 to ' +
+      'deliberately run the listener unauthenticated (kb#180, DESIGN-a2a-agents.md §4).'
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// Express middleware factory. On success sets req.callerAgentId (string) and
+// req.callerToken, which the /mcp, /sse and /messages routes consume.
+// With auth disabled it sets req.callerAgentId from the token if one happens
+// to be present (so the vault gate keeps working) and lets the request through.
+export function listenerAuth(tokenMap, env = process.env) {
+  const enabled = requireAuthEnabled(env);
+  return function listenerAuthMiddleware(req, res, next) {
+    const token = authHeaderToken(req);
+    const agentId = resolveCallerAgent(token, tokenMap);
+    req.callerToken = token;
+    req.callerAgentId = agentId;
+
+    if (!enabled) return next();
+    if (PUBLIC_PATHS.has(req.path)) return next();
+    if (agentId) return next();
+
+    return denyUnauthenticated(req, res, token ? 'unknown-token' : 'no-credential');
+  };
+}
+
+// 401 body shape: JSON-RPC error for MCP routes (so an MCP client surfaces a
+// real protocol error rather than a parse failure), plain JSON elsewhere.
+export function denyUnauthenticated(req, res, reason) {
+  const message =
+    `unauthenticated: this endpoint requires an Authorization: Bearer <token> header ` +
+    `resolving to a known agent (kb#180, DESIGN-a2a-agents.md §4) [${reason}]`;
+  res.set('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer realm="agap-mcp"');
+  if (isJsonRpcPath(req.path)) {
+    return res.status(401).json({ jsonrpc: '2.0', error: { code: -32001, message }, id: null });
+  }
+  return res.status(401).json({ error: message });
+}
+
+export function isJsonRpcPath(path) {
+  return path === '/mcp' || path === '/messages' || path === '/sse';
+}
+
+// --- SSE session binding -------------------------------------------------
+// sessions: Map<sessionId, { transport, agentId, token }>
+
+export function bindSseSession(sessions, sessionId, transport, req) {
+  sessions.set(sessionId, {
+    transport,
+    agentId: req.callerAgentId || null,
+    token: req.callerToken || null,
+  });
+}
+
+// Returns { ok: true, transport } or { ok: false, status, reason }.
+// A /messages POST must (a) name a live session and (b) carry the SAME
+// caller identity that opened it. Comparing the agent id (not just "is
+// authenticated") is what stops agent B from driving agent A's session; the
+// token is compared too so two tokens mapped to the same agent id are still
+// treated as distinct sessions.
+export function authorizeSseSession(sessions, sessionId, req, env = process.env) {
+  const entry = sessions.get(sessionId);
+  if (!entry) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: 'unknown-session' };
+  if (!requireAuthEnabled(env)) return { ok: true, transport: entry.transport };
+  if (!req.callerAgentId) return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: 'no-credential' };
+  if (entry.agentId !== req.callerAgentId || entry.token !== req.callerToken) {
+    return { ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'session-caller-mismatch' };
+  }
+  return { ok: true, transport: entry.transport };
+}
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/server.js b/agap-mcp/src/server.js
index 40f6a65..6375e14 100644
--- a/agap-mcp/src/server.js
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/server.js
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ import { initHA, haGetState, haListEntities, haCallService, haGetHistory } from
 import { initZabbix, zabbixGetProblems, zabbixGetHosts, zabbixGetItems, zabbixGetTriggers } from './zabbix.js';
 import { initRadicale, radicaleListCalendars, radicaleListEvents, radicaleGetEvent, radicaleCreateCalendar, radicaleDeleteCalendar, radicalePutEvent, radicaleDeleteEvent, radicaleMoveEvent } from './radicale.js';
 import { initTodoist, todoistListTasks, todoistListProjects, todoistCreateTask, todoistUpdateTask, todoistCompleteTask } from './todoist.js';
+import { todoistCaptureIdea } from './capture.js';
 import { initMediaWiki, wikiSearch, wikiRead, wikiEdit } from './mediawiki.js';
 import { loadTokenMap, resolveCallerAgent, vaultAllowed, authHeaderToken } from './trust-gate.js';
+import { listenerAuth, assertListenerAuthConfig, requireAuthEnabled, bindSseSession, authorizeSseSession } from './listener-auth.js';
 
 const PORT = parseInt(process.env.PORT || '3100');
 
@@ -28,6 +30,21 @@ const PORT = parseInt(process.env.PORT || '3100');
 // (see DESIGN-a2a-agents.md v2.1 §5 — vault access = trusted only).
 const ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST = process.env.AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST === '1';
 const AGENT_TOKENS = loadTokenMap();
+const AGENT_TOKEN_COUNT = Object.keys(AGENT_TOKENS).length;
+
+// kb#182: ENFORCE=1 with an empty token map is fail-closed by design (see
+// requireVaultAccess below) but that means it silently denies EVERY caller,
+// including Adolf itself — a self-inflicted vault brick with no signal
+// unless someone is watching the logs. Make that state loud on boot.
+if (ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST && AGENT_TOKEN_COUNT === 0) {
+  console.error(
+    '\n*** agap-mcp WARNING: AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST=1 but AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS ' +
+    'is empty/unset. Every caller — including Adolf — will be denied vault access. ' +
+    'This is fail-closed, not a crash: the process will keep serving non-vault tools, ' +
+    'but ALL vw_* calls will error until AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS is populated with real ' +
+    'per-agent bearer tokens (kb#147/kb#182). Check /health for tokenMapSize. ***\n'
+  );
+}
 
 function requireVaultAccess(callerAgentId) {
   if (!ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST) return; // legacy behavior: unchanged until activated
@@ -80,8 +97,19 @@ function err(e) {
   return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Error: ${e.message}` }], isError: true };
 }
 
+// Track tool registrations for /health endpoint
+let registeredToolCount = 0;
+
 function createServer(callerAgentId = null) {
   const server = new McpServer({ name: 'agap-mcp', version: '1.0.0' });
+  const serverToolCount = { count: 0 };
+
+  // Wrap server.tool() to count registrations
+  const originalTool = server.tool.bind(server);
+  server.tool = function(name, description, params, handler) {
+    serverToolCount.count++;
+    return originalTool(name, description, params, handler);
+  };
 
 // --- Vaultwarden tools (kb#147: gated to trust_class >= trusted) ---
   server.tool('vw_get_password', 'Get password for a Vaultwarden item by name', { name: z.string() },
@@ -325,6 +353,17 @@ function createServer(callerAgentId = null) {
     try { return ok(await todoistCompleteTask({ id })); } catch (e) { return err(e); }
   });
 
+  // kb#170: capture an idea/quick task with lightweight (encoder-only, no
+  // Kimi/gemma call) AI classification -- area/urgency/decompose-need --
+  // then create it in Todoist tagged with the result. See capture.js header
+  // for why this tags with labels rather than reassigning projects.
+  server.tool('todoist_capture_idea', 'Capture a free-text idea: classify it (area: adolf/welfare/дом/семья/здоровье, urgency, whether it needs Kanboard decomposition) using local bge-m3 embeddings, then create it as a labelled Todoist task. No LLM call.', {
+    text: z.string().describe('The idea, in free text (Russian or English).'),
+    project_id: z.string().optional().describe('Force a specific Todoist project id; otherwise auto-routed only for an unambiguous семья match, else Inbox.'),
+  }, async ({ text, project_id }) => {
+    try { return ok(await todoistCaptureIdea({ text, project_id }, { listProjects: todoistListProjects })); } catch (e) { return err(e); }
+  });
+
   // --- MediaWiki (family wiki / РодоВики) tools ---
   server.tool('wiki_search', 'Search the family wiki (РодоВики) for pages matching a query. Returns title + snippet.', {
     query: z.string().describe('Search text, e.g. a person\'s name or event.'),
@@ -347,6 +386,10 @@ function createServer(callerAgentId = null) {
     try { return ok(await wikiEdit(title, text, summary)); } catch (e) { return err(e); }
   });
 
+  // Store tool count on the server for /health endpoint to access
+  server._toolCount = serverToolCount.count;
+  registeredToolCount = serverToolCount.count;
+
   return server;
 }
 
@@ -354,12 +397,24 @@ function createServer(callerAgentId = null) {
 const app = express();
 app.use(express.json());
 
+// kb#180: authenticate the LISTENER, not just vault tools. Mounted before
+// every route below, so /mcp, /sse, /messages and /capture-idea all require
+// a bearer token resolving to a known agent (/health stays open — see
+// listener-auth.js PUBLIC_PATHS). This middleware also populates
+// req.callerAgentId, which replaces the per-route resolveCallerAgent() call
+// the /mcp and /sse handlers used to do inline; the kb#147 vault gate then
+// consumes that same id, so one token per agent serves both gates.
+app.use(listenerAuth(AGENT_TOKENS));
+
+// sessionId -> { transport, agentId, token } (kb#180: the identity captured at
+// the /sse handshake is pinned to the session so /messages can't be hijacked
+// by anyone who merely learns/guesses the sessionId).
 const sseTransports = new Map();
 
 // Streamable HTTP — stateless: fresh server per request, survives container restarts
 app.all('/mcp', async (req, res) => {
   try {
-    const callerAgentId = resolveCallerAgent(authHeaderToken(req), AGENT_TOKENS);
+    const callerAgentId = req.callerAgentId ?? resolveCallerAgent(authHeaderToken(req), AGENT_TOKENS);
     const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: undefined });
     res.on('close', () => transport.close());
     await createServer(callerAgentId).connect(transport);
@@ -374,26 +429,85 @@ app.all('/mcp', async (req, res) => {
 
 // Legacy SSE — kept for backward compatibility
 app.get('/sse', async (req, res) => {
-  const callerAgentId = resolveCallerAgent(authHeaderToken(req), AGENT_TOKENS);
+  const callerAgentId = req.callerAgentId ?? resolveCallerAgent(authHeaderToken(req), AGENT_TOKENS);
   const transport = new SSEServerTransport('/messages', res);
-  sseTransports.set(transport.sessionId, transport);
+  bindSseSession(sseTransports, transport.sessionId, transport, req);
   res.on('close', () => sseTransports.delete(transport.sessionId));
   await createServer(callerAgentId).connect(transport);
 });
 
 app.post('/messages', async (req, res) => {
-  const transport = sseTransports.get(req.query.sessionId);
-  if (!transport) return res.status(400).send('Unknown session');
-  await transport.handlePostMessage(req, res);
+  // kb#180: a live sessionId is no longer sufficient — the POST must carry the
+  // same caller identity that opened the session at /sse.
+  const auth = authorizeSseSession(sseTransports, req.query.sessionId, req);
+  if (!auth.ok) return res.status(auth.status).json({ error: `/messages rejected: ${auth.reason} (kb#180)` });
+  await auth.transport.handlePostMessage(req, res);
 });
 
-app.get('/health', (_, res) => res.json({ status: 'ok', tools: 30, vaultTrustEnforced: ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST }));
+app.get('/health', (_, res) => res.json({
+  status: 'ok',
+  tools: registeredToolCount,
+  vaultTrustEnforced: ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST,
+  tokenMapSize: AGENT_TOKEN_COUNT,
+  // kb#182: surfaces the vault-brick footgun (ENFORCE=1 + no tokens = fail-closed
+  // for everyone, including Adolf) directly in /health instead of only at boot log.
+  vaultBrickRisk: ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST && AGENT_TOKEN_COUNT === 0,
+  // kb#180: whether the listener itself (not just vw_*) requires a bearer
+  // token. false here means an unauthenticated JSON-RPC surface on the LAN.
+  listenerAuthEnabled: requireAuthEnabled(),
+}));
 
-init()
-  .then(() => {
-    app.listen(PORT, () => console.log(`agap-mcp listening on :${PORT}`));
-  })
-  .catch(e => {
-    console.error('Init failed:', e.message);
+// kb#170: plain-REST twin of the todoist_capture_idea MCP tool, added for
+// the todoist-capture-plugin native `/idea` command (openai/
+// todoist-capture-plugin) — a native-command handler doesn't speak MCP
+// JSON-RPC, so it needs a plain JSON endpoint to reach the same
+// classify+create logic (capture.js) the MCP tool already exposes to
+// Adolf/Claude's model-driven path. No new trust boundary: same
+// unauthenticated-on-localhost posture as every other route in this file
+// today (see trust-gate.js header for the tracked gap).
+app.post('/capture-idea', async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const { text, project_id } = req.body || {};
+    const result = await todoistCaptureIdea({ text, project_id }, { listProjects: todoistListProjects });
+    res.json(result);
+  } catch (e) {
+    res.status(400).json({ error: e.message });
+  }
+});
+
+// kb#179: guard the real init()+listen() side effects so this module can be
+// `import`-ed by tests (trust-gate-http.test.mjs) to exercise the real
+// createServer()/requireVaultAccess()/app on a throwaway port WITHOUT
+// touching Vaultwarden/Gitea/HA/Zabbix or the live :3100 container. Only run
+// the side effects when server.js is executed directly (`node src/server.js`
+// / the production container entrypoint), never on import.
+const isMainModule = process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`;
+if (isMainModule) {
+  // kb#180: refuse to boot into an "authenticated but nobody can authenticate"
+  // state (auth on + empty token map). Crashing here makes a missing
+  // AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS look like a broken restart instead of a silently
+  // dead integration. Only reached when run directly, never on import.
+  try {
+    assertListenerAuthConfig(AGENT_TOKENS);
+  } catch (e) {
+    console.error(`agap-mcp refusing to start: ${e.message}`);
     process.exit(1);
-  });
+  }
+  init()
+    .then(() => {
+      app.listen(PORT, () => console.log(`agap-mcp listening on :${PORT}`));
+    })
+    .catch(e => {
+      console.error('Init failed:', e.message);
+      process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+
+// --- kb#179 test-only exports -------------------------------------------
+// Exposes the exact functions/objects the production /mcp route uses so
+// integration tests can boot the real enforcement path (ENFORCE=1 + a
+// synthetic token map/registry) over real HTTP, instead of re-implementing
+// the gate inline. Importing these does not start the server or call init().
+// kb#180 additionally exports the live sse session map so the HTTP tests can
+// assert /messages session-binding without reaching into module internals.
+export { app, createServer, requireVaultAccess, ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST, AGENT_TOKENS, sseTransports };
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs b/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs
index 9fa4172..bb7974c 100644
--- a/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs
@@ -1,24 +1,48 @@
-// kb#147 HTTP-layer proof, run with: node src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs
+// kb#179 HTTP-layer proof: exercises the REAL server.js /mcp handler, not a
+// reimplementation of it. Run with: node src/trust-gate-http.test.mjs
 //
-// Proves the Authorization-header -> agent-id -> trust-rank path end to end
-// over real HTTP, WITHOUT touching the live agap-mcp container (:3100),
-// LiteLLM, or Vaultwarden: this spins up a throwaway express app on an
-// ephemeral local port using the exact same trust-gate.js functions
-// server.js imports, with a synthetic registry + token map (no real bw
-// session, no real credentials). It exercises authHeaderToken() (the bit
-// trust-gate.test.mjs's pure unit tests can't reach, since it needs a real
-// `req` object) on top of the already-unit-tested trustRankOf/vaultAllowed.
+// kb#147's original version of this file re-implemented the gate inline
+// (its own express app + its own copy of the "if vault tool and not
+// allowed" check). That proved trust-gate.js's exported functions compose
+// correctly, but never proved the shipped server.js actually wires
+// requireVaultAccess() into every vw_* tool -- a vw_* tool registered
+// without the gate would still pass that test.
+//
+// This version instead:
+//   1. Sets AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST=1 and a synthetic
+//      AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS map BEFORE importing server.js (both are read
+//      once at module-load time), then dynamically imports server.js so it
+//      picks up ENFORCE=1 with a harness-only token map -- never the live
+//      container's tokens.
+//   2. Overrides trust-gate's registry cache with a synthetic registry (no
+//      real agent-registry.yaml read) via _resetRegistryCacheForTests --
+//      the exact test hook trust-gate.js already exports for this purpose.
+//   3. Boots server.js's real `app` (its actual app.all('/mcp', ...)
+//      handler, its real createServer()/requireVaultAccess()) on an
+//      ephemeral local port, and drives it over real HTTP using the MCP
+//      SDK's own Client + StreamableHTTPClientTransport -- real
+//      initialize + tools/call JSON-RPC round trips, not raw fetch().
+//   4. Does NOT call init() (never touches Vaultwarden/Gitea/HA/Zabbix) and
+//      never touches the live :3100 container -- server.js's init()+
+//      app.listen() side effects are guarded behind an isMainModule check
+//      specifically so this file can import the module safely (kb#179).
+//
+// Because init() never runs, the underlying vw* functions (vaultwarden.js)
+// are never given a bw session. For a TRUSTED caller the gate must let the
+// call through to that downstream code -- which then fails for its own
+// unrelated reason (no bw session) -- so "allowed" is asserted as "did NOT
+// fail with the gate's specific denial message", not "the vault call
+// succeeded". That's deliberate: it proves requireVaultAccess() did not
+// block the call, without shelling out to a real `bw` session anywhere in
+// this test.
 
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import express from 'express';
-import {
-  loadTokenMap,
-  resolveCallerAgent,
-  vaultAllowed,
-  authHeaderToken,
-  isVaultTool,
-  _resetRegistryCacheForTests,
-} from './trust-gate.js';
+
+process.env.AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST = '1';
+process.env.AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS = JSON.stringify({
+  'tok-adolf-e2e-test': 'adolf',
+  'tok-torgash-e2e-test': 'torgash',
+});
 
 const registry = {
   trust_classes: {
@@ -31,39 +55,102 @@ const registry = {
     { id: 'torgash', trust_class: 'sandboxed' },
   ],
 };
+
+const { _resetRegistryCacheForTests } = await import('./trust-gate.js');
 _resetRegistryCacheForTests(registry);
 
-const tokenMap = loadTokenMap(JSON.stringify({
-  'tok-adolf-e2e-test': 'adolf',
-  'tok-torgash-e2e-test': 'torgash',
-}));
+const { app, createServer, requireVaultAccess, ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST, AGENT_TOKENS, sseTransports } = await import('./server.js');
+const {
+  listenerAuth,
+  assertListenerAuthConfig,
+  ListenerAuthConfigError,
+  requireAuthEnabled,
+  bindSseSession,
+  authorizeSseSession,
+} = await import('./listener-auth.js');
 
-// A minimal stand-in for server.js's app.all('/mcp', ...) handler: resolve
-// the caller from the Authorization header, then simulate a vw_get_password
-// tool call gated the same way requireVaultAccess() gates it in server.js.
-const app = express();
-app.post('/mcp', (req, res) => {
-  const callerAgentId = resolveCallerAgent(authHeaderToken(req), tokenMap);
-  const toolName = req.body?.tool || 'vw_get_password';
-  if (isVaultTool(toolName) && !vaultAllowed(callerAgentId, registry)) {
-    return res.status(200).json({ isError: true, error: `vault access denied for caller=${callerAgentId || '(none)'}` });
+assert.equal(ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST, true, 'sanity: server.js must have picked up AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST=1 at import time');
+assert.equal(Object.keys(AGENT_TOKENS).length, 2, 'sanity: server.js must have picked up the synthetic AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS');
+
+const VW_TOOLS = ['vw_get_password', 'vw_get_item', 'vw_list_items', 'vw_create_login', 'vw_update_password'];
+const DENIED_RE = /vault access denied/;
+
+// Bind explicitly to 127.0.0.1, with retries: `app.listen(0)` binds the IPv6
+// wildcard `::` on this host and intermittently fails EADDRINUSE under
+// ephemeral-port pressure, which made this harness flaky (~2 runs in 3)
+// regardless of what it asserts. Loopback-only is also the right posture for
+// a test that deliberately probes an unauthenticated endpoint.
+async function listenOnFreeLoopbackPort(attempts = 10) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < attempts; i++) {
+    const s = app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+    const outcome = await new Promise(resolve => {
+      s.once('listening', () => resolve('ok'));
+      s.once('error', e => resolve(e));
+    });
+    if (outcome === 'ok') return s;
+    if (outcome.code !== 'EADDRINUSE') throw outcome;
   }
-  return res.status(200).json({ isError: false, caller: callerAgentId });
-});
+  throw new Error('could not bind a free loopback port after multiple attempts');
+}
 
-const server = app.listen(0);
+const server = await listenOnFreeLoopbackPort();
 const port = server.address().port;
+const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/mcp`;
 
-async function post(token) {
-  const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/mcp`, {
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: {
-      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
-      ...(token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {}),
-    },
-    body: JSON.stringify({ tool: 'vw_get_password' }),
-  });
-  return res.json();
+const { Client } = await import('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js');
+const { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } = await import('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js');
+
+// Minimal argument stubs matching each tool's zod schema -- the gate must
+// fire before any of these are used for real (requireVaultAccess is the
+// first statement in every vw_* handler in server.js), so their exact
+// values don't matter for the deny path.
+const ARGS = {
+  vw_get_password: { name: 'probe' },
+  vw_get_item: { name: 'probe' },
+  vw_list_items: {},
+  vw_create_login: { name: 'probe', password: 'x' },
+  vw_update_password: { name: 'probe', password: 'x' },
+};
+
+// callToolAsCaller: connects a fresh MCP client to the real /mcp route with
+// the given bearer token (or none), calls `tool`, and returns the tool
+// result. `undefined`/omitted mimics resolveCallerAgent's "no header at
+// all" path; a token string that isn't in AGENT_TOKENS mimics "unknown
+// token".
+//
+// kb#180 note: since the listener itself now requires auth, an unauthenticated
+// or unknown-token client is rejected at the HTTP layer (401) during
+// connect() — before any tool handler runs. That is a STRICTER outcome than
+// the tool-level "vault access denied" this file originally asserted for
+// those two cases, so those checks now assert the 401 instead. The
+// authenticated-but-sandboxed (torgash) case is what still proves the kb#147
+// vault gate itself, and the trusted (adolf) case still proves the gate lets
+// a trusted caller through.
+const AUTH_REJECTED = Symbol('listener-auth-rejected');
+
+async function callToolAsCaller(token, tool) {
+  const requestInit = token ? { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } } : {};
+  const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL(baseUrl), { requestInit });
+  const client = new Client({ name: 'kb179-test-client', version: '1.0.0' });
+  try {
+    await client.connect(transport);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (/401|unauthenticated/i.test(e.message)) return AUTH_REJECTED;
+    throw e;
+  }
+  try {
+    return await client.callTool({ name: tool, arguments: ARGS[tool] });
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (/401|unauthenticated/i.test(e.message)) return AUTH_REJECTED;
+    throw e;
+  } finally {
+    await client.close().catch(() => {});
+  }
+}
+
+function toolErrorText(result) {
+  const block = result?.content?.find(c => c.type === 'text');
+  return block?.text || '';
 }
 
 let passed = 0;
@@ -74,26 +161,199 @@ async function check(label, fn) {
 }
 
 try {
-  await check('trusted agent (adolf) bearer token -> vw_get_password allowed over real HTTP', async () => {
-    const body = await post('tok-adolf-e2e-test');
-    assert.equal(body.isError, false);
-    assert.equal(body.caller, 'adolf');
+  for (const tool of VW_TOOLS) {
+    await check(`${tool}: no Authorization header -> DENIED over real HTTP (kb#180: 401 at the listener)`, async () => {
+      const result = await callToolAsCaller(null, tool);
+      assert.equal(result, AUTH_REJECTED, 'expected the listener to reject an unauthenticated MCP client');
+    });
+
+    await check(`${tool}: unknown/never-issued token -> DENIED over real HTTP (kb#180: 401 at the listener)`, async () => {
+      const result = await callToolAsCaller('this-token-was-never-issued', tool);
+      assert.equal(result, AUTH_REJECTED, 'expected the listener to reject an unknown bearer token');
+    });
+
+    await check(`${tool}: sandboxed agent (torgash) token -> DENIED over real HTTP`, async () => {
+      const result = await callToolAsCaller('tok-torgash-e2e-test', tool);
+      assert.equal(result.isError, true);
+      assert.match(toolErrorText(result), DENIED_RE);
+    });
+
+    await check(`${tool}: trusted agent (adolf) token -> gate ALLOWS (not blocked by requireVaultAccess) over real HTTP`, async () => {
+      const result = await callToolAsCaller('tok-adolf-e2e-test', tool);
+      // The gate must not be what blocks this call. Downstream vaultwarden.js
+      // has no bw session here (init() deliberately never ran), so the call
+      // may still fail -- just not with the gate's denial message.
+      assert.doesNotMatch(toolErrorText(result), DENIED_RE);
+    });
+  }
+
+  // --- Guard test (kb#179 acceptance bar #2) ---------------------------
+  // Fails if any vw_* tool is ever registered on createServer() without
+  // calling requireVaultAccess(). Rather than re-deriving this from source
+  // text (fragile to refactors), it drives the real registered handler for
+  // every tool name starting with "vw_" as an untrusted/denied caller and
+  // asserts the gate's specific denial message comes back. A vw_* tool
+  // that forgot to call requireVaultAccess would either succeed or throw a
+  // different (non-gate) error here, and this test would catch it.
+  await check('guard: every registered vw_* tool enforces requireVaultAccess()', async () => {
+    // A caller id that resolves to no agent in the (synthetic) registry --
+    // trustRankOf() returns -1 for it, so vaultAllowed() must be false and
+    // requireVaultAccess() must throw for every vw_* tool.
+    const probeServer = createServer('this-agent-id-does-not-exist-in-registry');
+    // McpServer keeps its registrations on `._registeredTools` (name ->
+    // { handler, ... }); read the real registry createServer() just
+    // populated rather than re-deriving tool names by hand, so a future
+    // vw_* tool is covered automatically.
+    const registeredTools = probeServer._registeredTools;
+    assert.ok(registeredTools && Object.keys(registeredTools).length > 0,
+      'expected createServer() to have registered tools onto the McpServer instance');
+
+    const vwToolNames = Object.keys(registeredTools).filter(n => n.startsWith('vw_'));
+    assert.ok(vwToolNames.length >= VW_TOOLS.length, `expected at least ${VW_TOOLS.length} vw_* tools registered, found: ${vwToolNames.join(', ')}`);
+
+    for (const name of vwToolNames) {
+      const handler = registeredTools[name].handler;
+      assert.ok(typeof handler === 'function', `could not locate callable handler for ${name}`);
+      const result = await handler(ARGS[name] || {}, {});
+      assert.equal(result.isError, true, `${name}: expected denial for an unregistered agent id, got success -- is requireVaultAccess() missing?`);
+      assert.match(toolErrorText(result), DENIED_RE, `${name}: expected the gate's denial message, got: ${toolErrorText(result)} -- is requireVaultAccess() missing or not the first check?`);
+    }
   });
 
-  await check('sandboxed agent (torgash) bearer token -> vw_get_password DENIED over real HTTP', async () => {
-    const body = await post('tok-torgash-e2e-test');
-    assert.equal(body.isError, true);
-    assert.match(body.error, /vault access denied/);
+  // --- kb#180: the LISTENER is authenticated, not just vault tools --------
+  const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  const authed = { Authorization: 'Bearer tok-torgash-e2e-test' }; // sandboxed but *known*
+
+  await check('kb#180: unauthenticated POST /mcp -> 401 (raw curl-equivalent)', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/mcp`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list', params: {} }),
+    });
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401);
+    assert.equal(res.headers.get('www-authenticate'), 'Bearer realm="agap-mcp"');
+    const body = await res.json();
+    assert.equal(body.jsonrpc, '2.0', 'MCP routes must answer with a JSON-RPC error envelope');
+    assert.match(body.error.message, /unauthenticated/);
   });
 
-  await check('no Authorization header at all -> vw_get_password DENIED over real HTTP', async () => {
-    const body = await post(null);
-    assert.equal(body.isError, true);
+  await check('kb#180: unauthenticated POST /capture-idea -> 401 (no Todoist write)', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/capture-idea`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ text: 'unauthenticated probe — must never reach Todoist' }),
+    });
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401);
+    const body = await res.json();
+    assert.match(body.error, /unauthenticated/);
   });
 
-  await check('garbage/unknown token -> vw_get_password DENIED over real HTTP', async () => {
-    const body = await post('this-token-was-never-issued');
-    assert.equal(body.isError, true);
+  await check('kb#180: unknown token on /capture-idea -> 401', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/capture-idea`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: 'Bearer nope' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ text: 'probe' }),
+    });
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401);
+  });
+
+  await check('kb#180: unauthenticated GET /sse -> 401', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/sse`, { headers: { Accept: 'text/event-stream' } });
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401);
+    await res.arrayBuffer();
+  });
+
+  await check('kb#180: unauthenticated POST /messages -> 401 (was: any sessionId accepted)', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/messages?sessionId=whatever`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' }),
+    });
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401);
+  });
+
+  await check('kb#180: /health stays open and reports listenerAuthEnabled=true', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/health`);
+    assert.equal(res.status, 200);
+    const body = await res.json();
+    assert.equal(body.listenerAuthEnabled, true);
+  });
+
+  await check('kb#180: an authenticated (known-token) caller still reaches the tool surface', async () => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/mcp`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream', ...authed },
+      body: JSON.stringify({
+        jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'initialize',
+        params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 't', version: '1' } },
+      }),
+    });
+    assert.notEqual(res.status, 401, 'a known token must not be rejected by the listener gate');
+    assert.ok(res.status < 500, `expected the request to be served, got ${res.status}`);
+    await res.arrayBuffer();
+  });
+
+  // --- kb#180: /messages must match its /sse handshake identity ----------
+  await check('kb#180: /messages rejects a session opened by a DIFFERENT agent (hijack)', () => {
+    const sessions = new Map();
+    bindSseSession(sessions, 'sess-1', { id: 'transport-a' },
+      { callerAgentId: 'adolf', callerToken: 'tok-adolf-e2e-test' });
+
+    const sameCaller = authorizeSseSession(sessions, 'sess-1',
+      { callerAgentId: 'adolf', callerToken: 'tok-adolf-e2e-test' });
+    assert.equal(sameCaller.ok, true, 'the agent that opened the session must keep using it');
+
+    const otherAgent = authorizeSseSession(sessions, 'sess-1',
+      { callerAgentId: 'torgash', callerToken: 'tok-torgash-e2e-test' });
+    assert.equal(otherAgent.ok, false);
+    assert.equal(otherAgent.status, 403);
+    assert.equal(otherAgent.reason, 'session-caller-mismatch');
+
+    const noCreds = authorizeSseSession(sessions, 'sess-1', { callerAgentId: null, callerToken: null });
+    assert.equal(noCreds.ok, false);
+    assert.equal(noCreds.status, 401);
+
+    const unknownSession = authorizeSseSession(sessions, 'nope',
+      { callerAgentId: 'adolf', callerToken: 'tok-adolf-e2e-test' });
+    assert.equal(unknownSession.ok, false);
+    assert.equal(unknownSession.status, 400);
+  });
+
+  await check('kb#180: the live server binds real /sse sessions to a caller identity', () => {
+    // sseTransports is the exact map the /sse and /messages routes use; its
+    // entries must be {transport, agentId, token}, not a bare transport.
+    assert.ok(sseTransports instanceof Map);
+    bindSseSession(sseTransports, 'probe-session', { probe: true },
+      { callerAgentId: 'adolf', callerToken: 'tok-adolf-e2e-test' });
+    const entry = sseTransports.get('probe-session');
+    assert.equal(entry.agentId, 'adolf');
+    assert.equal(entry.token, 'tok-adolf-e2e-test');
+    sseTransports.delete('probe-session');
+  });
+
+  // --- kb#180: boot-time config guard ------------------------------------
+  await check('kb#180: auth on + empty token map = refuse to boot (not silent all-deny)', () => {
+    assert.throws(() => assertListenerAuthConfig({}, { }), ListenerAuthConfigError);
+    assert.throws(() => assertListenerAuthConfig(Object.create(null), { AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH: '1' }), ListenerAuthConfigError);
+    // Explicit opt-out is allowed (warns, does not throw) — the rollback path.
+    assert.doesNotThrow(() => assertListenerAuthConfig({}, { AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH: '0' }));
+    // Configured normally: fine.
+    assert.doesNotThrow(() => assertListenerAuthConfig({ t: 'adolf' }, {}));
+  });
+
+  await check('kb#180: AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH=0 is the only way to get the old open listener', () => {
+    assert.equal(requireAuthEnabled({}), true, 'auth must default ON');
+    assert.equal(requireAuthEnabled({ AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH: '1' }), true);
+    assert.equal(requireAuthEnabled({ AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH: '0' }), false);
+    // ...and with it off, an unauthenticated request passes through the
+    // middleware while still resolving an agent id when a token IS present.
+    const mw = listenerAuth({ 'tok-adolf-e2e-test': 'adolf' }, { AGAP_MCP_REQUIRE_AUTH: '0' });
+    let nexted = false;
+    mw({ headers: {}, path: '/mcp' }, null, () => { nexted = true; });
+    assert.equal(nexted, true);
+    const req = { headers: { authorization: 'Bearer tok-adolf-e2e-test' }, path: '/mcp' };
+    mw(req, null, () => {});
+    assert.equal(req.callerAgentId, 'adolf', 'vault gate must still see the caller id when listener auth is off');
   });
 
   console.log(`\n${passed} passed`);
diff --git a/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate.js b/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate.js
index bffdcb0..09a1a10 100644
--- a/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate.js
+++ b/agap-mcp/src/trust-gate.js
@@ -62,18 +62,30 @@ export function trustRankOf(agentId, registry = loadRegistry()) {
 // AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS (JSON), itself sourced from per-agent tokens stored in
 // Vaultwarden and injected via this container's .env, never inlined in git.
 export function loadTokenMap(raw = process.env.AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS) {
-  if (!raw) return {};
+  if (!raw) return Object.create(null);
   try {
     const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
-    return (parsed && typeof parsed === 'object') ? parsed : {};
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') return Object.create(null);
+    // Rebuild onto a null-proto object so a token literally named
+    // "__proto__"/"constructor"/"prototype" in AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS can
+    // never merge into Object.prototype instead of becoming an own key.
+    return Object.assign(Object.create(null), parsed);
   } catch (e) {
     console.error(`trust-gate: AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS is not valid JSON: ${e.message}`);
-    return {};
+    return Object.create(null);
   }
 }
 
 export function resolveCallerAgent(bearerToken, tokenMap) {
-  if (!bearerToken) return null;
+  if (!bearerToken || !tokenMap) return null;
+  // Guard against prototype-key inputs: a bearer token of "__proto__",
+  // "constructor", or "prototype" must never resolve via the object's
+  // prototype chain (e.g. tokenMap['__proto__'] returning Object.prototype,
+  // which is truthy and would silently "authenticate" as a non-existent
+  // agent). Object.hasOwn only ever matches an actual own property that was
+  // set from AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS, so a __proto__ probe resolves to null
+  // explicitly regardless of the token map's shape (kb#182).
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(tokenMap, bearerToken)) return null;
   return tokenMap[bearerToken] || null;
 }