Files
AgapHost/openai/validate_capability_grants.py
alvis b548a8f345 agap-mcp: MediaWiki + Todoist tools, vault trust-gate, registry wiring
Commits a cluster of entangled agap-mcp / Adolf-tooling WIP that had accumulated
uncommitted in shared files (server.js, the three MCP-config layers). Bundled as
one commit because server.js interleaves all of it and cannot be cleanly split;
each stream is named here for the record. Authorized by alvis 2026-07-23.

- **kb#95 — family MediaWiki tools:** new src/mediawiki.js (wiki_search / wiki_read
  / wiki_edit, MediaWiki login->CSRF->edit flow, no new deps), registered in
  server.js and fetched from the family.alogins.net Vaultwarden login item.
  Proven standalone against family.alogins.net (search/read/edit, revid 1520 on a
  bot-userspace page). Wired into all three layers: openai/shared-mcp.json,
  adolf/openclaw.json, openai/agent-registry.yaml.

- **kb#147 — vault trust-gate (A2A-15), DORMANT:** new src/trust-gate.js (+ two
  test files), requireVaultAccess() around the vw_* tools, gated by
  AGAP_MCP_ENFORCE_VAULT_TRUST (docker-compose.yml, default 0). OFF by default —
  vw_* behaviour is byte-for-byte unchanged until an operator sets ENFORCE=1 and
  populates AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS from Vaultwarden. That activation is a separate
  human step; kb#147 remains escalated for human verification and is NOT verified
  by this commit. js-yaml added to read the registry. agent-registry.yaml mounted
  read-only as the trust-class source of truth.

- **Todoist tools:** new src/todoist.js (initTodoist + 6 todoist_* tools),
  registered in server.js, sourced from the TODOIST_TOKEN Vaultwarden item.

- **kanboard cutover cleanup:** removes src/kanboard.js and its imports — the
  kanboard_* slice moved to the standalone kanboard-mcp on 2026-07-06.

- **openai/validate_capability_grants.py:** cross-checks the registry against the
  live openclaw.json + shared-mcp.json layers; passes (exit 0).

No secrets committed: all tokens come from Vaultwarden via env/.env; the trust
gate's AGAP_MCP_AGENT_TOKENS defaults to `{}` (fail-closed). node_modules/ now
gitignored, package-lock.json tracked.

NOT YET ACTIVATED: agap-mcp has not been rebuilt and adolf-llm/adolf not
restarted, so the wiki/todoist tools are wired but not live. That restart is the
outstanding step on kb#95 (and stays a human/orchestrator action).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 06:48:07 +00:00

314 lines
14 KiB
Python
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""validate_capability_grants — kb#147 (A2A-15), extended by kb#144 (A2A-12):
cross-check that agent-registry.yaml's declared tool_allowlist.mcp_servers
(server-level) AND tool_allowlist.mcp_tool_filter (per-tool level, kb#144)
for each agent match what that agent's real, git-controlled config actually
grants it -- at BOTH layers that materialize a tool bundle for Adolf:
1. OpenClaw's own mcp.servers.*.toolFilter.include in adolf/openclaw.json
(adolf's own MCP client surface).
2. shared-mcp.json's per-server `enabledTools` (kb#144 verification pass,
2026-07-22): what adolf-llm/server.js's writeMcpConfig() seeds into
each Kimi CLI session's project-root .mcp.json -- the layer that
ACTUALLY determines the MODEL's tool bundle for Adolf's kimi backbone.
Layer 1 alone shipped a false "Done" once already (kb#144 first pass):
wire.jsonl proved Kimi's tool counts were unchanged because OpenClaw's
toolFilter never reaches the Kimi CLI, which reads its own
enabledTools/disabledTools (McpServerCommonFields, computeEnabledNames
-- confirmed by decompiling the installed @moonshot-ai/kimi-code
package's dist/main.mjs). Checking only layer 1 would pass this
validator while leaving the real per-turn token bloat unfixed again.
Read-only. Makes no live changes and touches no running service — it just
diffs already-committed files so a registry edit that silently drifts from
an agent's real config fails loudly (exit 1) instead of rotting quietly,
which is exactly the "scattered configs" failure mode kb#147's acceptance
bar ("grants live in the agent registry, not scattered configs") exists to
prevent. kb#144's acceptance bar ("Adolf's tools are sourced from the
registry") means both layers, not just the one OpenClaw itself reads.
Only agents with a `prompt_source` pointing at a real openclaw.json-shaped
config are checked; agents that are registry-only target state (torgash,
researcher — no config file exists yet) are reported as skipped, not failed.
Usage:
./validate_capability_grants.py
./validate_capability_grants.py --openclaw-json ../adolf/openclaw.json --id adolf
"""
import argparse
import json
import re
import sys
import agent_registry as ar
HERE_ADOLF_OPENCLAW_JSON = "../adolf/openclaw.json"
SHARED_MCP_JSON = "shared-mcp.json"
# id -> path to the git-controlled OpenClaw config that IS this agent's live
# MCP surface. Only adolf has one today (claude-coder has no openclaw.json --
# it's a CLAUDE.md-driven persona, not an OpenClaw runtime; see its
# capability_grant note in agent-registry.yaml).
KNOWN_CONFIGS = {
"adolf": HERE_ADOLF_OPENCLAW_JSON,
}
# id -> path to the shared-mcp.json this agent's backbone runtime seeds its
# session .mcp.json from (kb#144 layer-2 check, see module docstring). Only
# agents on a Kimi-CLI-shaped backbone go through this file at all.
KNOWN_SHARED_MCP = {
"adolf": SHARED_MCP_JSON,
}
def _strip_jsonc_comments(text):
"""Drop // line comments. Good enough for this read-only check: this
file's comments are all on their own line or trail real content with no
'//' inside a string value today -- verified by hand."""
out = []
for line in text.splitlines():
stripped = line.strip()
if stripped.startswith("//"):
continue
m = re.search(r'(?<!:)//', line)
if m and line[: m.start()].count('"') % 2 == 0:
line = line[: m.start()]
out.append(line)
return "\n".join(out)
def _find_key_brace(text, key, start=0):
"""Find `key: {` (bare or quoted key) at or after `start`; return the
index of the matching '{'."""
m = re.search(rf'["\']?{re.escape(key)}["\']?\s*:\s*\{{', text[start:])
if not m:
raise ValueError(f"key {key!r} not found from offset {start}")
return start + m.end() - 1 # index of the '{' itself
def _matching_close_brace(text, open_idx):
depth = 0
for i in range(open_idx, len(text)):
if text[i] == '{':
depth += 1
elif text[i] == '}':
depth -= 1
if depth == 0:
return i
raise ValueError("unbalanced braces")
def _extract_object_top_level_keys(text, key_path):
"""openclaw.json is JS-object-literal JSON5 (bare identifier keys,
trailing commas) -- `json.loads` can't touch it and pulling in a JSON5
parser is overkill for one narrow read. Instead: locate `key_path`
(e.g. ["mcp", "servers"]) by finding each key's opening '{' in turn, then
brace-depth-scan that object collecting only its DIRECT child keys
(`name: {` at depth 1). Sufficient and honest for this validation
script's one job; not a general JSON5 reader."""
pos = 0
open_idx = 0
for key in key_path:
open_idx = _find_key_brace(text, key, pos)
pos = open_idx + 1
close_idx = _matching_close_brace(text, open_idx)
body = text[open_idx + 1 : close_idx]
# Depth-0 identifiers immediately followed by ": {" are this object's
# direct child keys (mcp.servers' entries are always objects). Only try
# a key match right after a boundary ('{', ',', or start-of-body) so an
# identifier can't be "matched" starting mid-token from inside a nested
# value (the earlier, buggy version of this scanner did exactly that).
keys = []
depth = 0
i, n = 0, len(body)
prev_boundary = True
key_re = re.compile(r'["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)["\']?\s*:\s*\{')
while i < n:
ch = body[i]
if ch in ' \t\r\n':
i += 1
continue
if depth == 0 and prev_boundary:
m = key_re.match(body, i)
if m:
keys.append(m.group(1))
i = m.end() - 1 # land on the key's '{' so the normal handling below opens depth 1
prev_boundary = False
continue
if ch == '{':
depth += 1
prev_boundary = True
elif ch == '}':
depth -= 1
prev_boundary = True
elif ch == ',':
prev_boundary = True
else:
prev_boundary = False
i += 1
return sorted(keys)
def load_mcp_servers(path):
with open(path) as f:
raw = f.read()
text = _strip_jsonc_comments(raw)
return _extract_object_top_level_keys(text, ["mcp", "servers"])
def _locate_object(text, key_path, start=0):
"""Chase `key_path` (e.g. ["mcp", "servers", "hindsight"]) through nested
`key: {` objects, same navigation _extract_object_top_level_keys does
internally, exposed standalone so other extractors (toolFilter below)
can reuse it instead of re-deriving brace offsets."""
pos = start
open_idx = start
for key in key_path:
open_idx = _find_key_brace(text, key, pos)
pos = open_idx + 1
close_idx = _matching_close_brace(text, open_idx)
return open_idx, close_idx
def _matching_close_bracket(text, open_idx):
"""Same brace-depth-scan as _matching_close_brace, for '[' / ']' — needed
to bound a toolFilter.include array (a list, not an object)."""
depth = 0
for i in range(open_idx, len(text)):
if text[i] == '[':
depth += 1
elif text[i] == ']':
depth -= 1
if depth == 0:
return i
raise ValueError("unbalanced brackets")
def load_tool_filter(path, server_name):
"""kb#144: extract mcp.servers.<server_name>.toolFilter.include as a
sorted list of tool names, or None if that server has no toolFilter (or
no include list) at all — OpenClaw's own semantics for "no toolFilter":
every tool the server offers stays eligible (see schema-BqdpWz19.js:
"When omitted, all server tools remain eligible unless excluded.").
exclude-only filters are not modeled here (none of Adolf's servers use
exclude today) and are reported as None (unrestricted) rather than
silently mis-parsed.
"""
with open(path) as f:
raw = f.read()
text = _strip_jsonc_comments(raw)
try:
server_open, server_close = _locate_object(text, ["mcp", "servers", server_name])
except ValueError:
return None # server not present in this config at all
body = text[server_open : server_close + 1]
try:
tf_open, tf_close = _locate_object(body, ["toolFilter"])
except ValueError:
return None # no toolFilter -> unrestricted, by OpenClaw's own semantics
tf_body = body[tf_open : tf_close + 1]
m = re.search(r'["\']?include["\']?\s*:\s*\[', tf_body)
if not m:
return None # exclude-only or empty toolFilter -- not modeled, treat as unrestricted
bracket_open = tf_body.index('[', m.start())
bracket_close = _matching_close_bracket(tf_body, bracket_open)
arr_body = tf_body[bracket_open + 1 : bracket_close]
return sorted(re.findall(r'["\']([A-Za-z0-9_.\-\*]+)["\']', arr_body))
def load_shared_mcp_enabled_tools(path):
"""kb#144 layer-2 check (see module docstring): shared-mcp.json is
strict JSON (no JSON5 quirks, unlike openclaw.json), so a plain
`json.load` is enough -- no brace-scanner needed here. Returns
{server_name: sorted-tool-list-or-None}, None meaning no `enabledTools`
key on that server (unfiltered -- every tool it offers stays eligible,
same "omitted = unrestricted" semantics as OpenClaw's own toolFilter).
"""
with open(path) as f:
data = json.load(f)
out = {}
for name, cfg in (data.get("mcpServers") or {}).items():
tools = cfg.get("enabledTools")
out[name] = sorted(tools) if tools else None
return out
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
ap.add_argument("--registry", default=None)
ap.add_argument("--openclaw-json", default=None, help="override path for --id's config")
ap.add_argument("--id", default=None, help="only this agent id (default: every id in KNOWN_CONFIGS)")
args = ap.parse_args()
reg = ar.load_registry(args.registry)
ids = [args.id] if args.id else list(KNOWN_CONFIGS)
failures = 0
for agent_id in ids:
agent = ar.get_agent(reg, agent_id)
declared = sorted((agent.get("tool_allowlist") or {}).get("mcp_servers") or [])
config_path = args.openclaw_json or KNOWN_CONFIGS.get(agent_id)
if not config_path:
print(f"SKIP {agent_id}: no known live config to cross-check (target-state agent)")
continue
try:
live = load_mcp_servers(config_path)
except FileNotFoundError:
print(f"SKIP {agent_id}: config not found at {config_path}")
continue
if declared == live:
print(f"OK {agent_id}: registry tool_allowlist.mcp_servers == live {config_path} mcp.servers -> {live}")
else:
failures += 1
print(f"FAIL {agent_id}: registry says {declared} but {config_path} actually grants {live}")
# kb#144: per-tool cross-check, same idea one level down. Only
# meaningful for servers the registry actually declares a filter
# for (mcp_tool_filter); a server absent from that map is not
# asserted either way here (it may be intentionally unfiltered).
declared_filters = (agent.get("tool_allowlist") or {}).get("mcp_tool_filter") or {}
for server_name, declared_tools in declared_filters.items():
live_tools = load_tool_filter(config_path, server_name)
declared_sorted = sorted(declared_tools) if declared_tools else None
if declared_sorted == live_tools:
shown = live_tools if live_tools is not None else "(unfiltered)"
print(f"OK {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter == live toolFilter.include -> {shown}")
else:
failures += 1
print(f"FAIL {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter says {declared_sorted} but live toolFilter.include is {live_tools}")
# kb#144 layer-2: the file that actually reaches the MODEL for a
# Kimi-backed agent (see module docstring for why layer 1 alone
# missed the real bug once already). Servers the registry declares a
# filter for but that don't appear in shared-mcp.json at all (e.g.
# marketplace, which OpenClaw carries but Kimi's session never sees)
# are not asserted here -- that's a separate, pre-existing gap
# between what OpenClaw offers Adolf and what reaches Kimi, not a
# drift this validator's job to catch.
shared_mcp_path = KNOWN_SHARED_MCP.get(agent_id)
if shared_mcp_path:
try:
live_shared = load_shared_mcp_enabled_tools(shared_mcp_path)
except FileNotFoundError:
print(f"SKIP {agent_id}: shared-mcp.json not found at {shared_mcp_path}")
else:
for server_name, declared_tools in declared_filters.items():
if server_name not in live_shared:
continue
declared_sorted = sorted(declared_tools) if declared_tools else None
live_tools = live_shared[server_name]
if declared_sorted == live_tools:
shown = live_tools if live_tools is not None else "(unfiltered)"
print(f"OK {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter == live shared-mcp.json enabledTools -> {shown}")
else:
failures += 1
print(f"FAIL {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter says {declared_sorted} but shared-mcp.json enabledTools is {live_tools}")
sys.exit(1 if failures else 0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()