Vendor OpenClaw source as Adolf fork baseline

Adolf is a fork/vendored clone of github.com/openclaw/openclaw (v2026.6.11),
free to diverge. Tree copied sans upstream .git; upstream remote added for
future syncs. Node pinned to 24 (.nvmrc); engines already require >=22.19.
Preserves docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LeqyaxJF2nbRXJtae2kNB2

docs/platforms/mac/xpc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+summary: "macOS IPC architecture for OpenClaw app, gateway node transport, and PeekabooBridge"
+read_when:
+  - Editing IPC contracts or menu bar app IPC
+title: "macOS IPC"
+---
+
+# OpenClaw macOS IPC architecture
+
+A local Unix socket connects the node host service to the macOS app for exec approvals and `system.run`. An `openclaw-mac` debug CLI (`apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawMacCLI`) exists for discovery/connect checks; agent actions still flow through the Gateway WebSocket and `node.invoke`. UI automation uses PeekabooBridge.
+
+## Goals
+
+- Single GUI app instance that owns all TCC-facing work (notifications, screen recording, mic, speech, AppleScript).
+- A small surface for automation: Gateway + node commands, plus PeekabooBridge for UI automation.
+- Predictable permissions: always the same signed bundle ID, launched by launchd, so TCC grants stick.
+
+## How it works
+
+### Gateway + node transport
+
+- The app runs the Gateway (local mode) and connects to it as a node.
+- Agent actions are performed via `node.invoke` (e.g. `system.run`, `system.notify`, `canvas.*`).
+- Node commands include `canvas.*`, `camera.snap`, `camera.clip`, `screen.snapshot`, `screen.record`, `system.run`, and `system.notify`.
+- The node reports a `permissions` map so agents can see whether screen, camera, microphone, speech, automation, or accessibility access is available.
+
+### Node service + app IPC
+
+- A headless node host service connects to the Gateway WebSocket.
+- `system.run` requests are forwarded to the macOS app over a local Unix socket (`ExecApprovalsSocket.swift`).
+- The app performs the exec in UI context, prompts if needed, and returns output.
+
+Diagram (SCI):
+
+```text
+Agent -> Gateway -> Node Service (WS)
+                      |  IPC (UDS + token + HMAC + TTL)
+                      v
+                  Mac App (UI + TCC + system.run)
+```
+
+### PeekabooBridge (UI automation)
+
+- UI automation uses a separate UNIX socket (`~/Library/Application Support/OpenClaw/<socket>`) and the PeekabooBridge JSON protocol.
+- Host preference order (client-side): Peekaboo.app -> Claude.app -> OpenClaw.app -> local execution.
+- Security: bridge hosts require an allowlisted TeamID (the bundled `PeekabooBridgeHostCoordinator` allowlists a fixed team plus the app's own signing team); a DEBUG-only same-UID escape hatch is guarded by `PEEKABOO_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_SOCKET_CLIENTS=1` (Peekaboo convention).
+- See: [PeekabooBridge usage](/platforms/mac/peekaboo) for details.
+
+## Operational flows
+
+- Restart/rebuild: `scripts/restart-mac.sh` kills existing instances, rebuilds via Swift, repackages, and relaunches. It auto-detects an available signing identity and falls back to `--no-sign` if none is found; pass `--sign` to require signing (fails if no key is available) or `--no-sign` to force the unsigned path. `SIGN_IDENTITY` set in the environment is unset on the signed path, so `scripts/codesign-mac-app.sh`'s own identity auto-detection picks the cert.
+- Single instance: the app checks `NSWorkspace.runningApplications` for a duplicate bundle ID and exits if more than one instance is found (`isDuplicateInstance()` in `MenuBar.swift`).
+
+## Hardening notes
+
+- Prefer requiring a TeamID match for all privileged surfaces.
+- PeekabooBridge: `PEEKABOO_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_SOCKET_CLIENTS=1` (DEBUG-only) may allow same-UID callers for local development.
+- All communication remains local-only; no network sockets are exposed.
+- TCC prompts originate only from the GUI app bundle; keep the signed bundle ID stable across rebuilds.
+- Exec approvals socket hardening: file mode `0600`, shared token, peer-UID check (`getpeereid`), HMAC-SHA256 challenge/response, and a short TTL on requests.
+
+## Related
+
+- [macOS app](/platforms/macos)
+- [macOS IPC flow (Exec approvals)](/tools/exec-approvals-advanced#macos-ipc-flow)