Vendor OpenClaw source as Adolf fork baseline

Adolf is a fork/vendored clone of github.com/openclaw/openclaw (v2026.6.11),
free to diverge. Tree copied sans upstream .git; upstream remote added for
future syncs. Node pinned to 24 (.nvmrc); engines already require >=22.19.
Preserves docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LeqyaxJF2nbRXJtae2kNB2

docs/plugins/reference/policy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+---
+summary: "Adds policy-backed doctor checks for workspace conformance."
+read_when:
+  - You are installing, configuring, or auditing the policy plugin
+title: "Policy plugin"
+---
+
+# Policy plugin
+
+Adds policy-backed doctor checks for workspace conformance.
+
+## Distribution
+
+- Package: `@openclaw/policy`
+- Install route: included in OpenClaw
+
+## Surface
+
+plugin
+
+<!-- openclaw-plugin-reference:manual-start -->
+
+## Behavior
+
+The Policy plugin contributes doctor health checks for policy-managed OpenClaw
+settings and governed workspace declarations. Policy currently covers channel
+conformance, governed tool metadata, MCP server posture, model-provider posture,
+private-network access posture, Gateway exposure posture, agent workspace/tool
+posture, configured global/per-agent tool posture, configured sandbox runtime
+posture, ingress/channel access posture, data-handling posture, and OpenClaw config secret
+provider/auth profile posture.
+
+Policy stores authored requirements in `policy.jsonc`, observes existing
+OpenClaw settings and workspace declarations as evidence, and reports drift
+through `openclaw policy check` and `openclaw doctor --lint`. A clean policy
+check emits policy, evidence, findings, and attestation hashes that operators
+can record for audit.
+
+`openclaw policy compare --baseline <file>` compares one policy file to another
+policy file. It is config-level conformance only: it uses policy rule metadata
+to verify that the checked policy is not missing or weaker than the authored
+baseline, and it does not inspect runtime state, credentials, or secret values.
+
+Tool posture rules can require approved profiles, workspace-only filesystem
+tools, bounded exec security/ask/host settings, disabled elevated mode, exact
+`alsoAllow` entries, and required tool deny entries. The evidence records
+additive `alsoAllow` entries because they can widen effective tool posture.
+These checks observe config conformance only; they do not read runtime approval
+state or add runtime enforcement.
+
+Sandbox posture rules can require approved sandbox modes/backends, deny host
+container networking, deny container namespace joins, require read-only container
+mounts, deny container runtime socket mounts and unconfined container profiles,
+and require sandbox browser CDP source ranges.
+These checks observe config conformance only; they do not read runtime approval
+state, inspect live containers, or add runtime enforcement.
+
+Data-handling rules can require sensitive logging redaction, deny telemetry
+content capture, require session retention maintenance, and deny session
+transcript memory indexing. These checks observe config conformance only; they
+do not inspect raw logs, telemetry exports, transcripts, memory files, secrets,
+or personal data.
+
+Named policy scopes under `scopes.<scopeName>` can add stricter normal policy
+sections for the selector they list. `agentIds` supports `tools`,
+`agents.workspace`, `sandbox`, and `dataHandling.memory`; `channelIds` supports
+`ingress.channels`.
+Runtime agent ids that are not explicitly listed in `agents.list[]` are checked
+against inherited global/default posture rather than silently passing with no
+evidence. Every scope present in `policy.jsonc` must be valid and enforceable
+for its selector. Overlay rules are additional claims, so they do not weaken
+top-level policy and can produce their own findings when the same observed
+config violates both scopes.
+
+<!-- openclaw-plugin-reference:manual-end -->
+
+## Related docs
+
+- [policy](/cli/policy)