Vendor OpenClaw source as Adolf fork baseline

Adolf is a fork/vendored clone of github.com/openclaw/openclaw (v2026.6.11),
free to diverge. Tree copied sans upstream .git; upstream remote added for
future syncs. Node pinned to 24 (.nvmrc); engines already require >=22.19.
Preserves docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LeqyaxJF2nbRXJtae2kNB2

extensions/synology-chat/src/security.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/**
+ * Security module: token validation, rate limiting, input sanitization, user allowlist.
+ */
+
+import { resolveStableChannelMessageIngress } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/channel-ingress-runtime";
+import { finiteSecondsToTimerSafeMilliseconds } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/number-runtime";
+import { safeEqualSecret } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/security-runtime";
+import { truncateUtf16Safe } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/text-utility-runtime";
+import {
+  createFixedWindowRateLimiter,
+  type FixedWindowRateLimiter,
+} from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/webhook-ingress";
+
+/**
+ * Validate webhook token using constant-time comparison.
+ * Reject empty tokens explicitly; use shared constant-time comparison otherwise.
+ */
+export function validateToken(received: string, expected: string): boolean {
+  if (!received || !expected) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return safeEqualSecret(received, expected);
+}
+
+export async function authorizeUserForDmWithIngress(params: {
+  accountId: string;
+  userId: string;
+  dmPolicy: "open" | "allowlist" | "disabled";
+  allowedUserIds: string[];
+}) {
+  return await resolveStableChannelMessageIngress({
+    channelId: "synology-chat",
+    accountId: params.accountId,
+    identity: {
+      key: "sender-id",
+      entryIdPrefix: "synology-chat-entry",
+    },
+    subject: { stableId: params.userId },
+    conversation: {
+      kind: "direct",
+      id: "direct",
+    },
+    event: { mayPair: false },
+    dmPolicy: params.dmPolicy,
+    allowFrom: params.allowedUserIds,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize user input to prevent prompt injection attacks.
+ * Filters known dangerous patterns and truncates long messages.
+ */
+export function sanitizeInput(text: string): string {
+  const dangerousPatterns = [
+    /ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+(instructions?|prompts?)/gi,
+    /you\s+are\s+now\s+/gi,
+    /system:\s*/gi,
+    /<\|.*?\|>/g, // special tokens
+  ];
+
+  let sanitized = text;
+  for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
+    sanitized = sanitized.replace(pattern, "[FILTERED]");
+  }
+
+  const maxLength = 4000;
+  if (sanitized.length > maxLength) {
+    sanitized = truncateUtf16Safe(sanitized, maxLength) + "... [truncated]";
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sliding window rate limiter per user ID.
+ */
+export class RateLimiter {
+  private readonly limiter: FixedWindowRateLimiter;
+  private readonly limit: number;
+
+  constructor(limit = 30, windowSeconds = 60, maxTrackedUsers = 5_000) {
+    this.limit = limit;
+    const windowMs = finiteSecondsToTimerSafeMilliseconds(windowSeconds) ?? 1;
+    this.limiter = createFixedWindowRateLimiter({
+      windowMs,
+      maxRequests: Math.max(1, Math.floor(limit)),
+      maxTrackedKeys: Math.max(1, Math.floor(maxTrackedUsers)),
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Returns true if the request is allowed, false if rate-limited. */
+  check(userId: string): boolean {
+    return !this.limiter.isRateLimited(userId);
+  }
+
+  /** Exposed for tests and diagnostics. */
+  size(): number {
+    return this.limiter.size();
+  }
+
+  /** Exposed for tests and account lifecycle cleanup. */
+  clear(): void {
+    this.limiter.clear();
+  }
+
+  /** Exposed for tests. */
+  maxRequests(): number {
+    return this.limit;
+  }
+}