Vendor OpenClaw source as Adolf fork baseline

Adolf is a fork/vendored clone of github.com/openclaw/openclaw (v2026.6.11),
free to diverge. Tree copied sans upstream .git; upstream remote added for
future syncs. Node pinned to 24 (.nvmrc); engines already require >=22.19.
Preserves docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LeqyaxJF2nbRXJtae2kNB2

packages/net-policy/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+{
+  "name": "@openclaw/net-policy",
+  "version": "0.0.0-private",
+  "private": true,
+  "files": [
+    "dist"
+  ],
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./dist/index.mjs",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.mts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.mts",
+      "import": "./dist/index.mjs",
+      "default": "./dist/index.mjs"
+    },
+    "./ip": {
+      "types": "./dist/ip.d.mts",
+      "import": "./dist/ip.mjs",
+      "default": "./dist/ip.mjs"
+    },
+    "./ipv4": {
+      "types": "./dist/ipv4.d.mts",
+      "import": "./dist/ipv4.mjs",
+      "default": "./dist/ipv4.mjs"
+    },
+    "./redact-sensitive-url": {
+      "types": "./dist/redact-sensitive-url.d.mts",
+      "import": "./dist/redact-sensitive-url.mjs",
+      "default": "./dist/redact-sensitive-url.mjs"
+    },
+    "./url-protocol": {
+      "types": "./dist/url-protocol.d.mts",
+      "import": "./dist/url-protocol.mjs",
+      "default": "./dist/url-protocol.mjs"
+    },
+    "./url-userinfo": {
+      "types": "./dist/url-userinfo.d.mts",
+      "import": "./dist/url-userinfo.mjs",
+      "default": "./dist/url-userinfo.mjs"
+    }
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsdown src/index.ts src/ip.ts src/ipv4.ts src/redact-sensitive-url.ts src/url-protocol.ts src/url-userinfo.ts --no-config --platform node --format esm --dts --out-dir dist --clean"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "ipaddr.js": "2.4.0"
+  }
+}

packages/net-policy/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// Public network policy package surface for IP parsing, redaction, and URL
+// userinfo stripping helpers.
+export * from "./ip.js";
+export * from "./ipv4.js";
+export * from "./redact-sensitive-url.js";
+export * from "./url-protocol.js";
+export * from "./url-userinfo.js";

packages/net-policy/src/ip-test-fixtures.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+// Network Policy module implements ip test fixtures behavior.
+export const blockedIpv6MulticastLiterals = ["ff02::1", "ff05::1:3", "[ff02::1]"] as const;

packages/net-policy/src/ip.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// Network Policy tests cover ip behavior.
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { blockedIpv6MulticastLiterals } from "./ip-test-fixtures.js";
+import {
+  extractEmbeddedIpv4FromIpv6,
+  isBlockedSpecialUseIpv4Address,
+  isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address,
+  isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4,
+  isCarrierGradeNatIpv4Address,
+  isCloudMetadataIpAddress,
+  isIpInCidr,
+  isIpv4Address,
+  isIpv6Address,
+  isLegacyIpv4Literal,
+  isLinkLocalIpAddress,
+  isLoopbackIpAddress,
+  isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress,
+  isRfc1918Ipv4Address,
+  normalizeIpAddress,
+  parseCanonicalIpAddress,
+  parseLooseIpAddress,
+} from "./ip.js";
+
+describe("shared ip helpers", () => {
+  it("distinguishes canonical dotted IPv4 from legacy forms", () => {
+    expect(isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4("0177.0.0.1")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isLegacyIpv4Literal("0177.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLegacyIpv4Literal("127.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLegacyIpv4Literal("example.com")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("matches both IPv4 and IPv6 CIDRs", () => {
+    expect(isIpInCidr("10.42.0.59", "10.42.0.0/24")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpInCidr("10.43.0.59", "10.42.0.0/24")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpInCidr("2001:db8::1234", "2001:db8::/32")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpInCidr("2001:db9::1234", "2001:db8::/32")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpInCidr("::ffff:127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpInCidr("127.0.0.1", "::ffff:127.0.0.2")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("extracts embedded IPv4 for transition prefixes", () => {
+    const cases = [
+      ["::ffff:127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"],
+      ["::127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"],
+      ["64:ff9b::8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8"],
+      ["64:ff9b:1::10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1"],
+      ["2002:0808:0808::", "8.8.8.8"],
+      ["2001::f7f7:f7f7", "8.8.8.8"],
+      ["2001:4860:1::5efe:7f00:1", "127.0.0.1"],
+    ] as const;
+    for (const [ipv6Literal, expectedIpv4] of cases) {
+      const parsed = parseCanonicalIpAddress(ipv6Literal);
+      expect(parsed?.kind(), ipv6Literal).toBe("ipv6");
+      if (!parsed || !isIpv6Address(parsed)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      expect(extractEmbeddedIpv4FromIpv6(parsed)?.toString(), ipv6Literal).toBe(expectedIpv4);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("treats blocked IPv6 classes as private/internal", () => {
+    expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress("fec0::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress("2001:2::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress("100::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress("2001:20::1")).toBe(true);
+    for (const literal of blockedIpv6MulticastLiterals) {
+      expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress(literal)).toBe(true);
+    }
+    expect(isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress("2001:4860:4860::8888")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("normalizes canonical IP strings and loopback detection", () => {
+    expect(normalizeIpAddress("[::FFFF:127.0.0.1]")).toBe("127.0.0.1");
+    expect(normalizeIpAddress("  [2001:DB8::1]  ")).toBe("2001:db8::1");
+    expect(isLoopbackIpAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackIpAddress("198.18.0.1")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("detects link-local addresses without treating normal private ranges as link-local", () => {
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("169.254.169.254")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("::ffff:169.254.169.254")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("2852039166")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("0xa9fea9fe")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("0xa9.0xfe.0xa9.0xfe")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("64:ff9b::169.254.169.254")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("2002:a9fe:a9fe::")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("fe80::1%lo0")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("[fe80::1]")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("10.0.0.5")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isLinkLocalIpAddress("fd00::1")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("detects known non-link-local cloud metadata IPs", () => {
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("100.100.100.200")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("::ffff:100.100.100.200")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("64:ff9b::100.100.100.200")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("64:ff9b:1::6464:64c8")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("2002:6464:64c8::")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("1684301000")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("fd00:ec2::254")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("[fd00:ec2::254]")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("100.100.100.201")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("169.254.169.254")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isCloudMetadataIpAddress("fd00::1")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("parses loose legacy IPv4 literals that canonical parsing rejects", () => {
+    expect(parseCanonicalIpAddress("0177.0.0.1")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(parseLooseIpAddress("0177.0.0.1")?.toString()).toBe("127.0.0.1");
+    expect(parseLooseIpAddress("[::1]")?.toString()).toBe("::1");
+  });
+
+  it("classifies RFC1918 and carrier-grade-nat IPv4 ranges", () => {
+    expect(isRfc1918Ipv4Address("10.42.0.59")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isRfc1918Ipv4Address("100.64.0.1")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isCarrierGradeNatIpv4Address("100.64.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isCarrierGradeNatIpv4Address("10.42.0.59")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("blocks special-use IPv4 ranges while allowing optional RFC2544 benchmark addresses", () => {
+    const loopback = parseCanonicalIpAddress("127.0.0.1");
+    const benchmark = parseCanonicalIpAddress("198.18.0.1");
+
+    expect(loopback?.kind()).toBe("ipv4");
+    expect(benchmark?.kind()).toBe("ipv4");
+    if (!loopback || !isIpv4Address(loopback) || !benchmark || !isIpv4Address(benchmark)) {
+      throw new Error("expected ipv4 fixtures");
+    }
+
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv4Address(loopback)).toBe(true);
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv4Address(benchmark)).toBe(true);
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv4Address(benchmark, { allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange: true })).toBe(
+      false,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("blocks IPv6 unique-local addresses by default and exempts them on opt-in (#74351)", () => {
+    // fc00::/7 is the IPv6 ULA range. Sing-box / Clash / Surge fake-ip
+    // proxies resolve foreign domains here, alongside the IPv4 198.18.0.0/15
+    // benchmark range. Operators using those proxies need both ranges
+    // exempted to keep web_fetch working.
+    const ula = parseCanonicalIpAddress("fc00::1");
+    expect(ula?.kind()).toBe("ipv6");
+    if (!ula || !isIpv6Address(ula)) {
+      throw new Error("expected ipv6 fixture");
+    }
+
+    // Default policy (no options) must continue to block the ULA range.
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(ula)).toBe(true);
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(ula, {})).toBe(true);
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(ula, { allowUniqueLocalRange: false })).toBe(true);
+
+    // Opt-in flag — the only path the SSRF policy uses to thread fake-ip
+    // proxy intent through to the address classifier.
+    expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(ula, { allowUniqueLocalRange: true })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("opt-in unique-local exemption does NOT bleed into other special-use IPv6 ranges (#74351)", () => {
+    // The exemption must be scoped: loopback (::1), unspecified (::), and
+    // multicast (ff00::/8) all stay blocked even when `allowUniqueLocalRange`
+    // is set, otherwise the flag silently widens the SSRF escape hatch
+    // beyond what operators opted into.
+    const loopback = parseCanonicalIpAddress("::1");
+    const multicast = parseCanonicalIpAddress("ff02::1");
+    const siteLocal = parseCanonicalIpAddress("fec0::1"); // deprecated fec0::/10
+
+    if (
+      !loopback ||
+      !isIpv6Address(loopback) ||
+      !multicast ||
+      !isIpv6Address(multicast) ||
+      !siteLocal ||
+      !isIpv6Address(siteLocal)
+    ) {
+      throw new Error("expected ipv6 fixtures");
+    }
+
+    for (const options of [{}, { allowUniqueLocalRange: true }] as const) {
+      expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(loopback, options)).toBe(true);
+      expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(multicast, options)).toBe(true);
+      expect(isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(siteLocal, options)).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+});

packages/net-policy/src/ip.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+// Network Policy module implements ip behavior.
+import ipaddr from "ipaddr.js";
+
+function normalizeOptionalString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
+  if (typeof value !== "string") {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  return trimmed || undefined;
+}
+
+function normalizeLowercaseStringOrEmpty(value: unknown): string {
+  return typeof value === "string" ? value.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
+}
+
+/** Parsed IP address value returned by the net-policy parsing helpers. */
+export type ParsedIpAddress = ipaddr.IPv4 | ipaddr.IPv6;
+type Ipv4Range = ReturnType<ipaddr.IPv4["range"]>;
+type Ipv6Range = ReturnType<ipaddr.IPv6["range"]>;
+type BlockedIpv6Range = Ipv6Range | "discard";
+
+const BLOCKED_IPV4_SPECIAL_USE_RANGES = new Set<Ipv4Range>([
+  "unspecified",
+  "broadcast",
+  "multicast",
+  "linkLocal",
+  "loopback",
+  "carrierGradeNat",
+  "private",
+  "reserved",
+]);
+
+const PRIVATE_OR_LOOPBACK_IPV4_RANGES = new Set<Ipv4Range>([
+  "loopback",
+  "private",
+  "linkLocal",
+  "carrierGradeNat",
+]);
+
+const BLOCKED_IPV6_SPECIAL_USE_RANGES = new Set<BlockedIpv6Range>([
+  "unspecified",
+  "loopback",
+  "linkLocal",
+  "uniqueLocal",
+  "multicast",
+  "reserved",
+  "benchmarking",
+  "discard",
+  "orchid2",
+]);
+const RFC2544_BENCHMARK_PREFIX: [ipaddr.IPv4, number] = [ipaddr.IPv4.parse("198.18.0.0"), 15];
+const CLOUD_METADATA_IP_ADDRESSES = new Set(["100.100.100.200", "fd00:ec2::254"]);
+/** Per-call exemptions for `isBlockedSpecialUseIpv4Address`. */
+export type Ipv4SpecialUseBlockOptions = {
+  allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange?: boolean;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Per-call exemptions for `isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address`. Mirror of
+ * {@link Ipv4SpecialUseBlockOptions} for the IPv6 side. Currently only
+ * `allowUniqueLocalRange` is exposed (#74351); other reserved IPv6 ranges stay
+ * unconditionally blocked because they have no documented fake-ip / proxy
+ * use case.
+ */
+export type Ipv6SpecialUseBlockOptions = {
+  /**
+   * When true, exempt addresses in `fc00::/7` (the IPv6 Unique Local Address
+   * block, RFC 4193) from the SSRF private-IP block. Sing-box / Clash / Surge
+   * fake-ip implementations resolve foreign domains to ULA addresses
+   * alongside RFC 2544 benchmark IPv4 addresses, and operators using those
+   * proxy stacks need both ranges exempted to keep `web_fetch` working.
+   */
+  allowUniqueLocalRange?: boolean;
+};
+
+const EMBEDDED_IPV4_SENTINEL_RULES: Array<{
+  matches: (parts: number[]) => boolean;
+  toHextets: (parts: number[]) => [high: number, low: number];
+}> = [
+  {
+    // IPv4-compatible form ::w.x.y.z (deprecated, but still seen in parser edge-cases).
+    matches: (parts) =>
+      parts[0] === 0 &&
+      parts[1] === 0 &&
+      parts[2] === 0 &&
+      parts[3] === 0 &&
+      parts[4] === 0 &&
+      parts[5] === 0,
+    toHextets: (parts) => [parts[6], parts[7]],
+  },
+  {
+    // NAT64 local-use prefix: 64:ff9b:1::/48.
+    matches: (parts) =>
+      parts[0] === 0x0064 &&
+      parts[1] === 0xff9b &&
+      parts[2] === 0x0001 &&
+      parts[3] === 0 &&
+      parts[4] === 0 &&
+      parts[5] === 0,
+    toHextets: (parts) => [parts[6], parts[7]],
+  },
+  {
+    // 6to4 prefix: 2002::/16 (IPv4 lives in hextets 1..2).
+    matches: (parts) => parts[0] === 0x2002,
+    toHextets: (parts) => [parts[1], parts[2]],
+  },
+  {
+    // Teredo prefix: 2001:0000::/32 (client IPv4 XOR 0xffff in hextets 6..7).
+    matches: (parts) => parts[0] === 0x2001 && parts[1] === 0x0000,
+    toHextets: (parts) => [parts[6] ^ 0xffff, parts[7] ^ 0xffff],
+  },
+  {
+    // ISATAP IID marker: ....:0000:5efe:w.x.y.z with u/g bits allowed in hextet 4.
+    matches: (parts) => (parts[4] & 0xfcff) === 0 && parts[5] === 0x5efe,
+    toHextets: (parts) => [parts[6], parts[7]],
+  },
+];
+
+function stripIpv6Brackets(value: string): string {
+  if (value.startsWith("[") && value.endsWith("]")) {
+    return value.slice(1, -1);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+function isNumericIpv4LiteralPart(value: string): boolean {
+  return /^[0-9]+$/.test(value) || /^0x[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(value);
+}
+
+function parseIpv6WithEmbeddedIpv4(raw: string): ipaddr.IPv6 | undefined {
+  if (!raw.includes(":") || !raw.includes(".")) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const match = /^(.*:)([^:%]+(?:\.[^:%]+){3})(%[0-9A-Za-z]+)?$/i.exec(raw);
+  if (!match) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const [, prefix, embeddedIpv4, zoneSuffix = ""] = match;
+  if (!ipaddr.IPv4.isValidFourPartDecimal(embeddedIpv4)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const octets = embeddedIpv4.split(".").map((part) => Number.parseInt(part, 10));
+  const high = ((octets[0] << 8) | octets[1]).toString(16);
+  const low = ((octets[2] << 8) | octets[3]).toString(16);
+  const normalizedIpv6 = `${prefix}${high}:${low}${zoneSuffix}`;
+  if (!ipaddr.IPv6.isValid(normalizedIpv6)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return ipaddr.IPv6.parse(normalizedIpv6);
+}
+
+/** Type guard for parsed IPv4 addresses. */
+export function isIpv4Address(address: ParsedIpAddress): address is ipaddr.IPv4 {
+  return address.kind() === "ipv4";
+}
+
+/** Type guard for parsed IPv6 addresses. */
+export function isIpv6Address(address: ParsedIpAddress): address is ipaddr.IPv6 {
+  return address.kind() === "ipv6";
+}
+
+function normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(address: ParsedIpAddress): ParsedIpAddress {
+  if (!isIpv6Address(address)) {
+    return address;
+  }
+  if (!address.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+    return address;
+  }
+  return address.toIPv4Address();
+}
+
+function normalizeIpParseInput(raw: string | undefined): string | undefined {
+  const trimmed = normalizeOptionalString(raw);
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return stripIpv6Brackets(trimmed);
+}
+
+/** Parses canonical IPv4/IPv6 literals, rejecting legacy IPv4 shorthand forms. */
+export function parseCanonicalIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): ParsedIpAddress | undefined {
+  const normalized = normalizeIpParseInput(raw);
+  if (!normalized) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (ipaddr.IPv4.isValid(normalized)) {
+    if (!ipaddr.IPv4.isValidFourPartDecimal(normalized)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    return ipaddr.IPv4.parse(normalized);
+  }
+  if (ipaddr.IPv6.isValid(normalized)) {
+    return ipaddr.IPv6.parse(normalized);
+  }
+  return parseIpv6WithEmbeddedIpv4(normalized);
+}
+
+/** Parses canonical IP literals plus legacy IPv4 forms needed for SSRF checks. */
+export function parseLooseIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): ParsedIpAddress | undefined {
+  const normalized = normalizeIpParseInput(raw);
+  if (!normalized) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (ipaddr.isValid(normalized)) {
+    return ipaddr.parse(normalized);
+  }
+  return parseIpv6WithEmbeddedIpv4(normalized);
+}
+
+/** Normalizes canonical IP literals and maps IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to IPv4 text. */
+export function normalizeIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): string | undefined {
+  const parsed = parseCanonicalIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(parsed);
+  return normalizeLowercaseStringOrEmpty(normalized.toString());
+}
+
+/** True only for canonical four-part dotted-decimal IPv4 literals. */
+export function isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const trimmed = normalizeOptionalString(raw);
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = stripIpv6Brackets(trimmed);
+  if (!normalized) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return ipaddr.IPv4.isValidFourPartDecimal(normalized);
+}
+
+/** Detects legacy numeric IPv4 forms that canonical parsing deliberately rejects. */
+export function isLegacyIpv4Literal(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const trimmed = normalizeOptionalString(raw);
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = stripIpv6Brackets(trimmed);
+  if (!normalized || normalized.includes(":")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4(normalized)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const parts = normalized.split(".");
+  if (parts.length === 0 || parts.length > 4) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!parts.every((part) => isNumericIpv4LiteralPart(part))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/** True when a canonical IP literal is loopback, including IPv4-mapped IPv6. */
+export function isLoopbackIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const parsed = parseCanonicalIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(parsed);
+  return normalized.range() === "loopback";
+}
+
+/** True for link-local IPs, including legacy and embedded-IPv4 forms. */
+export function isLinkLocalIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const parsed = parseLooseIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(parsed);
+  if (isIpv4Address(normalized)) {
+    return normalized.range() === "linkLocal";
+  }
+  const embeddedIpv4 = extractEmbeddedIpv4FromIpv6(normalized);
+  if (embeddedIpv4?.range() === "linkLocal") {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return normalized.range() === "linkLocal";
+}
+
+/** True for cloud metadata IP literals, including mapped and embedded forms. */
+export function isCloudMetadataIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const parsed = parseLooseIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(parsed);
+  if (isIpv6Address(normalized)) {
+    const embeddedIpv4 = extractEmbeddedIpv4FromIpv6(normalized);
+    if (embeddedIpv4 && CLOUD_METADATA_IP_ADDRESSES.has(embeddedIpv4.toString())) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return CLOUD_METADATA_IP_ADDRESSES.has(normalized.toString());
+}
+
+/** True for canonical private, loopback, link-local, or blocked special-use IPs. */
+export function isPrivateOrLoopbackIpAddress(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const parsed = parseCanonicalIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(parsed);
+  if (isIpv4Address(normalized)) {
+    return PRIVATE_OR_LOOPBACK_IPV4_RANGES.has(normalized.range());
+  }
+  return isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(normalized);
+}
+
+/** Applies the SSRF block policy for parsed IPv6 special-use ranges. */
+export function isBlockedSpecialUseIpv6Address(
+  address: ipaddr.IPv6,
+  options: Ipv6SpecialUseBlockOptions = {},
+): boolean {
+  // ipaddr.js returns "discard" at runtime for 100::/64, but its published
+  // TypeScript IPv6Range union omits that literal.
+  const range = address.range() as BlockedIpv6Range;
+  if (range === "uniqueLocal" && options.allowUniqueLocalRange === true) {
+    // Operators running fake-ip proxy stacks (sing-box, Clash, Surge) opt in
+    // to fc00::/7 reaching the network — same intent as
+    // `allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange` for the IPv4 side (#74351).
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (BLOCKED_IPV6_SPECIAL_USE_RANGES.has(range)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // ipaddr.js does not classify deprecated site-local fec0::/10 as private.
+  return (address.parts[0] & 0xffc0) === 0xfec0;
+}
+
+/** True for canonical IPv4 literals in RFC 1918 private ranges. */
+export function isRfc1918Ipv4Address(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const parsed = parseCanonicalIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed || !isIpv4Address(parsed)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return parsed.range() === "private";
+}
+
+/** True for canonical IPv4 literals in the carrier-grade NAT range. */
+export function isCarrierGradeNatIpv4Address(raw: string | undefined): boolean {
+  const parsed = parseCanonicalIpAddress(raw);
+  if (!parsed || !isIpv4Address(parsed)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return parsed.range() === "carrierGradeNat";
+}
+
+/** Applies the SSRF block policy for parsed IPv4 special-use ranges. */
+export function isBlockedSpecialUseIpv4Address(
+  address: ipaddr.IPv4,
+  options: Ipv4SpecialUseBlockOptions = {},
+): boolean {
+  const inRfc2544BenchmarkRange = address.match(RFC2544_BENCHMARK_PREFIX);
+  if (inRfc2544BenchmarkRange && options.allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange === true) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return BLOCKED_IPV4_SPECIAL_USE_RANGES.has(address.range()) || inRfc2544BenchmarkRange;
+}
+
+function decodeIpv4FromHextets(high: number, low: number): ipaddr.IPv4 {
+  const octets: [number, number, number, number] = [
+    (high >>> 8) & 0xff,
+    high & 0xff,
+    (low >>> 8) & 0xff,
+    low & 0xff,
+  ];
+  return ipaddr.IPv4.parse(octets.join("."));
+}
+
+/** Extracts embedded IPv4 addresses from mapped and transition IPv6 prefixes. */
+export function extractEmbeddedIpv4FromIpv6(address: ipaddr.IPv6): ipaddr.IPv4 | undefined {
+  if (address.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+    return address.toIPv4Address();
+  }
+  if (address.range() === "rfc6145") {
+    return decodeIpv4FromHextets(address.parts[6], address.parts[7]);
+  }
+  if (address.range() === "rfc6052") {
+    return decodeIpv4FromHextets(address.parts[6], address.parts[7]);
+  }
+  for (const rule of EMBEDDED_IPV4_SENTINEL_RULES) {
+    if (!rule.matches(address.parts)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const [high, low] = rule.toHextets(address.parts);
+    return decodeIpv4FromHextets(high, low);
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+/** Checks an IP literal against an exact IP or CIDR range, normalizing mapped IPv4. */
+export function isIpInCidr(ip: string, cidr: string): boolean {
+  const normalizedIp = parseCanonicalIpAddress(ip);
+  if (!normalizedIp) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const candidate = cidr.trim();
+  if (!candidate) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const comparableIp = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(normalizedIp);
+  if (!candidate.includes("/")) {
+    const exact = parseCanonicalIpAddress(candidate);
+    if (!exact) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    const comparableExact = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(exact);
+    return (
+      comparableIp.kind() === comparableExact.kind() &&
+      comparableIp.toString() === comparableExact.toString()
+    );
+  }
+
+  let parsedCidr: [ParsedIpAddress, number];
+  try {
+    parsedCidr = ipaddr.parseCIDR(candidate);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const [baseAddress, prefixLength] = parsedCidr;
+  const comparableBase = normalizeIpv4MappedAddress(baseAddress);
+  if (comparableIp.kind() !== comparableBase.kind()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  try {
+    if (isIpv4Address(comparableIp) && isIpv4Address(comparableBase)) {
+      return comparableIp.match([comparableBase, prefixLength]);
+    }
+    if (isIpv6Address(comparableIp) && isIpv6Address(comparableBase)) {
+      return comparableIp.match([comparableBase, prefixLength]);
+    }
+    return false;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}

packages/net-policy/src/ipv4.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// Network Policy tests cover ipv4 behavior.
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input, validateIPv4AddressInput } from "./ipv4.js";
+
+describe("net-policy/ipv4", () => {
+  it("requires a value for custom bind mode", () => {
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input(undefined)).toBe(
+      "IP address is required for custom bind mode",
+    );
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("")).toBe("IP address is required for custom bind mode");
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("   ")).toBe(
+      "Invalid IPv4 address (e.g., 192.168.1.100)",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("accepts canonical dotted-decimal ipv4 only", () => {
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("0.0.0.0")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("192.168.1.100")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input(" 192.168.1.100 ")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("0177.0.0.1")).toBe(
+      "Invalid IPv4 address (e.g., 192.168.1.100)",
+    );
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("[192.168.1.100]")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("127.1")).toBe(
+      "Invalid IPv4 address (e.g., 192.168.1.100)",
+    );
+    expect(validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input("example.com")).toBe(
+      "Invalid IPv4 address (e.g., 192.168.1.100)",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the backward-compatible alias wired to the same validation", () => {
+    expect(validateIPv4AddressInput("192.168.1.100")).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(validateIPv4AddressInput("bad-ip")).toBe("Invalid IPv4 address (e.g., 192.168.1.100)");
+  });
+});

packages/net-policy/src/ipv4.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// Network Policy module implements ipv4 behavior.
+import { isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4 } from "./ip.js";
+
+/** Validates the custom-bind IPv4 input and returns the user-facing error text. */
+export function validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input(value: string | undefined): string | undefined {
+  if (!value) {
+    return "IP address is required for custom bind mode";
+  }
+  if (isCanonicalDottedDecimalIPv4(value)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return "Invalid IPv4 address (e.g., 192.168.1.100)";
+}
+
+/** @deprecated Use validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input. */
+export function validateIPv4AddressInput(value: string | undefined): string | undefined {
+  return validateDottedDecimalIPv4Input(value);
+}

packages/net-policy/src/redact-sensitive-url.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// Network Policy tests cover redact sensitive url behavior.
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName,
+  isSensitiveUrlConfigPath,
+  SENSITIVE_URL_HINT_TAG,
+  hasSensitiveUrlHintTag,
+  redactSensitiveUrl,
+  redactSensitiveUrlLikeString,
+} from "./redact-sensitive-url.js";
+
+describe("redactSensitiveUrl", () => {
+  it("redacts userinfo and sensitive query params from valid URLs", () => {
+    expect(redactSensitiveUrl("https://user:pass@example.com/mcp?token=secret&safe=value")).toBe(
+      "https://***:***@example.com/mcp?token=***&safe=value",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("treats query param names case-insensitively", () => {
+    expect(redactSensitiveUrl("https://example.com/mcp?Access_Token=secret")).toBe(
+      "https://example.com/mcp?Access_Token=***",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("redacts encoded and invisible-spliced sensitive query param names", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrl("https://example.com/mcp?client%5Fse%E2%80%8Bcret=secret&safe=value"),
+    ).toBe("https://example.com/mcp?client_se%E2%80%8Bcret=***&safe=value");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts encoded sensitive query names with decoded whitespace and control separators", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrl("https://example.com/mcp?client%5Fse%20cret=space&client%5Fse%00cret=nul"),
+    ).toBe("https://example.com/mcp?client_se+cret=***&client_se%00cret=***");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts query names with plus-encoded separators", () => {
+    expect(redactSensitiveUrl("https://example.com/mcp?client_se+cret=secret&safe=value")).toBe(
+      "https://example.com/mcp?client_se+cret=***&safe=value",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("keeps non-sensitive URLs unchanged", () => {
+    expect(redactSensitiveUrl("https://example.com/mcp?safe=value")).toBe(
+      "https://example.com/mcp?safe=value",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("redacts Telegram bot tokens from URL paths", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrl(
+        "https://telegram.internal/bot123456:ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_abcd/getMe",
+      ),
+    ).toBe("https://telegram.internal/bot***/getMe");
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrl(
+        "https://api.telegram.org/bot123456%3AABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_abcd/getMe",
+      ),
+    ).toBe("https://api.telegram.org/bot***/getMe");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("redactSensitiveUrlLikeString", () => {
+  it("redacts invalid URL-like strings", () => {
+    expect(redactSensitiveUrlLikeString("//user:pass@example.com/mcp?client_secret=secret")).toBe(
+      "//***:***@example.com/mcp?client_secret=***",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("redacts encoded and invisible-spliced query names in invalid URL-like strings", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrlLikeString("//example.com/mcp?client%5Fse%E2%80%8Bcret=secret&safe=value"),
+    ).toBe("//example.com/mcp?client%5Fse%E2%80%8Bcret=***&safe=value");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts encoded query names with decoded whitespace and control separators in invalid URL-like strings", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrlLikeString(
+        "//example.com/mcp?client%5Fse%20cret=space&client%5Fse%00cret=nul",
+      ),
+    ).toBe("//example.com/mcp?client%5Fse%20cret=***&client%5Fse%00cret=***");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts plus-spliced query names in invalid URL-like strings", () => {
+    expect(redactSensitiveUrlLikeString("//example.com/mcp?client_se+cret=secret&safe=value")).toBe(
+      "//example.com/mcp?client_se+cret=***&safe=value",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("redacts every URL-like userinfo occurrence in arbitrary text", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrlLikeString(
+        "fatal https://a:b@github.com/one.git and https://c:d@github.com/two.git",
+      ),
+    ).toBe("fatal https://***:***@github.com/one.git and https://***:***@github.com/two.git");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts protocol URLs that are too malformed to parse", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrlLikeString(
+        "wss://fallback-user:fallback-pass@[bad-host/socket?token=fallback-secret&keep=visible)",
+      ),
+    ).toBe("wss://***:***@[bad-host/socket?token=***&keep=visible)");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts Telegram bot tokens from URL-like fallback strings", () => {
+    expect(
+      redactSensitiveUrlLikeString(
+        "timeout /bot123456:ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_abcd/sendMessage and keep /bot/settings",
+      ),
+    ).toBe("timeout /bot***/sendMessage and keep /bot/settings");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName", () => {
+  it("matches the auth-oriented query params used by MCP SSE config redaction", () => {
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("token")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("refresh_token")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("access-token")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("hook-token")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("passwd")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("signature")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("code")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("x-amz-signature")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("X-Amz-Security-Token")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("id_token")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("app_secret")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("client%5Fse\u200Bcret")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("client%5Fse%20cret")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("client%5Fse%00cret")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("client_se+cret")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("client_se\u3164cret")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("credential")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName("safe")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("sensitive URL config metadata", () => {
+  it("recognizes config paths that may embed URL secrets", () => {
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlConfigPath("models.providers.*.baseUrl")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlConfigPath("mcp.servers.remote.url")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlConfigPath("gateway.remote.url")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("recognizes cdpUrl config paths as sensitive (browser CDP URLs can embed credentials)", () => {
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlConfigPath("browser.cdpUrl")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlConfigPath("browser.profiles.remote.cdpUrl")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSensitiveUrlConfigPath("browser.profiles.staging.cdpUrl")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("uses an explicit url-secret hint tag", () => {
+    expect(SENSITIVE_URL_HINT_TAG).toBe("url-secret");
+    expect(hasSensitiveUrlHintTag({ tags: [SENSITIVE_URL_HINT_TAG] })).toBe(true);
+    expect(hasSensitiveUrlHintTag({ tags: ["security"] })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

packages/net-policy/src/redact-sensitive-url.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// Network Policy module implements redact sensitive url behavior.
+type ConfigUiHintTags = {
+  tags?: string[];
+};
+
+function normalizeLowercaseStringOrEmpty(value: unknown): string {
+  return typeof value === "string" ? value.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
+}
+
+/** Config UI hint tag for URL-like values that may embed credentials or tokens. */
+export const SENSITIVE_URL_HINT_TAG = "url-secret";
+
+const SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_NAMES = new Set([
+  "token",
+  "key",
+  "api_key",
+  "apikey",
+  "secret",
+  "access_token",
+  "auth_token",
+  "password",
+  "pass",
+  "passwd",
+  "auth",
+  "jwt",
+  "session",
+  "id_token",
+  "code",
+  "client_secret",
+  "app_secret",
+  "hook_token",
+  "refresh_token",
+  "signature",
+  "x_amz_signature",
+  "x_amz_security_token",
+  "private_key",
+  "credential",
+  "authorization",
+]);
+// Keep in sync with FORM_BODY_KEY_SEPARATOR_RE in src/logging/redact.ts: Hangul fillers are
+// category Lo, so \p{C}\p{Z} alone would let them splice sensitive key names.
+const URL_QUERY_NAME_SEPARATOR_RE = /[\p{C}\p{Z}\u115F\u1160\u3164\uFFA0+]/gu;
+
+// Telegram Bot API credentials live in `/bot<token>/...` path segments rather
+// than userinfo or query params. Keep this shape aligned with logging/redact.ts.
+const TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_PATH_RE = /\/bot\d{6,}(?::|%3[aA])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?=\/|$)/giu;
+
+function redactSensitiveUrlPath(value: string): string {
+  return value.replace(TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_PATH_RE, "/bot***");
+}
+
+function normalizeUrlQueryParamName(name: string): string {
+  const stripped = name.replace(URL_QUERY_NAME_SEPARATOR_RE, "");
+  try {
+    return normalizeLowercaseStringOrEmpty(
+      decodeURIComponent(stripped).replace(URL_QUERY_NAME_SEPARATOR_RE, ""),
+    ).replaceAll("-", "_");
+  } catch {
+    return normalizeLowercaseStringOrEmpty(stripped).replaceAll("-", "_");
+  }
+}
+
+/** True for auth-like URL query parameter names that should be redacted. */
+export function isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName(name: string): boolean {
+  const normalized = normalizeUrlQueryParamName(name);
+  return SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_NAMES.has(normalized);
+}
+
+/** True for config paths whose URL values may contain credentials or secret query params. */
+export function isSensitiveUrlConfigPath(path: string): boolean {
+  if (path.endsWith(".baseUrl") || path.endsWith(".httpUrl")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (path.endsWith(".cdpUrl")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (path.endsWith(".request.proxy.url")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return /^mcp\.servers\.(?:\*|[^.]+)\.url$/.test(path);
+}
+
+/** True when a config UI hint explicitly marks a URL-like value as secret-bearing. */
+export function hasSensitiveUrlHintTag(hint: ConfigUiHintTags | undefined): boolean {
+  return hint?.tags?.includes(SENSITIVE_URL_HINT_TAG) === true;
+}
+
+/** Redacts credentials and sensitive query params from parseable URLs. */
+export function redactSensitiveUrl(value: string): string {
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(value);
+    let mutated = false;
+    const redactedPath = redactSensitiveUrlPath(parsed.pathname);
+    if (redactedPath !== parsed.pathname) {
+      parsed.pathname = redactedPath;
+      mutated = true;
+    }
+    if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+      parsed.username = parsed.username ? "***" : "";
+      parsed.password = parsed.password ? "***" : "";
+      mutated = true;
+    }
+    for (const key of Array.from(parsed.searchParams.keys())) {
+      if (isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName(key)) {
+        parsed.searchParams.set(key, "***");
+        mutated = true;
+      }
+    }
+    return mutated ? parsed.toString() : value;
+  } catch {
+    return value;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Redacts sensitive URL-looking substrings even when the full value is not a valid URL. */
+export function redactSensitiveUrlLikeString(value: string): string {
+  const redactedUrl = redactSensitiveUrl(value);
+  if (redactedUrl !== value) {
+    return redactedUrl;
+  }
+  const redactedFallback = value
+    .replace(/\/\/([^@/?#\s]+)@/g, "//***:***@")
+    .replace(/([?&])([^=&]+)=([^&]*)/g, (match, prefix: string, key: string) =>
+      isSensitiveUrlQueryParamName(key) ? `${prefix}${key}=***` : match,
+    );
+  return redactSensitiveUrlPath(redactedFallback);
+}

packages/net-policy/src/url-protocol.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { hasHttpUrlPrefix, isHttpsUrl, isHttpUrl, isWebSocketUrl } from "./url-protocol.js";
+
+describe("hasHttpUrlPrefix", () => {
+  it.each([
+    ["http://example.com", true],
+    ["HTTPS://user:pass@example.com:8443/path", true],
+    ["https://", true],
+    [" https://example.com", false],
+    ["//example.com", false],
+    ["example.com", false],
+    ["wss://example.com", false],
+  ])("classifies %j", (value, expected) => {
+    expect(hasHttpUrlPrefix(value)).toBe(expected);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("parsed URL protocol predicates", () => {
+  it.each([
+    ["http://example.com", true, false, false],
+    ["HTTPS://user:pass@example.com:8443/path", true, true, false],
+    ["ws://example.com", false, false, true],
+    ["WSS://example.com:9443/socket", false, false, true],
+    ["file:///tmp/example", false, false, false],
+  ])("classifies %s", (value, http, https, websocket) => {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    expect(isHttpUrl(url)).toBe(http);
+    expect(isHttpsUrl(url)).toBe(https);
+    expect(isWebSocketUrl(url)).toBe(websocket);
+  });
+
+  it("returns false for malformed and relative strings", () => {
+    expect(isHttpUrl("https://")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isHttpsUrl("/relative")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isWebSocketUrl("not a URL")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("parses string inputs without changing URL constructor behavior", () => {
+    expect(isHttpUrl("  HTTP://user:pass@example.com:8080/path  ")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isHttpsUrl(" HTTPS://example.com ")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isWebSocketUrl(" WSS://example.com:9443/socket ")).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

packages/net-policy/src/url-protocol.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+const HTTP_URL_PREFIX_RE = /^https?:\/\//i;
+
+function parseUrl(value: string | URL): URL | null {
+  if (value instanceof URL) {
+    return value;
+  }
+  try {
+    return new URL(value);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export function hasHttpUrlPrefix(value: string): boolean {
+  return HTTP_URL_PREFIX_RE.test(value);
+}
+
+export function isHttpUrl(value: string | URL): boolean {
+  const url = parseUrl(value);
+  return url?.protocol === "http:" || url?.protocol === "https:";
+}
+
+export function isHttpsUrl(value: string | URL): boolean {
+  return parseUrl(value)?.protocol === "https:";
+}
+
+export function isWebSocketUrl(value: string | URL): boolean {
+  const url = parseUrl(value);
+  return url?.protocol === "ws:" || url?.protocol === "wss:";
+}

packages/net-policy/src/url-userinfo.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/** Strip username/password credentials from a URL string when it parses. */
+export function stripUrlUserInfo(value: string): string {
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(value);
+    if (!parsed.username && !parsed.password) {
+      return value;
+    }
+    parsed.username = "";
+    parsed.password = "";
+    return parsed.toString();
+  } catch {
+    return value;
+  }
+}