Retires the Moonshot/Kimi subscription in favour of the already-paid ChatGPT plan. Both CLI wrappers now run `codex exec`; the kimi-agent container is gone. adolf-llm + hindsight-llm: - runKimi -> runCodex (`codex exec --json --skip-git-repo-check`), resume via `codex exec resume <thread_id>`. - MCP moves from a per-session .mcp.json (a workaround for Kimi having no --mcp-config-file flag) to a $CODEX_HOME/config.toml generated once at startup from shared-mcp.json. Field translation is load-bearing: bearerTokenEnvVar -> bearer_token_env_var, enabledTools -> enabled_tools. - approval_policy="never" + sandbox_mode required, or unattended turns block on an approval prompt nobody can answer. kimi-agent removed. It was the ONLY large-tier deployment behind LiteLLM, so deleting it outright would have silently degraded every large-tier request to the local 4B model via the existing fallbacks. tier-large, the auto_router complex-reasoning route and their fallbacks now point at the codex-backed adolf-llm wrapper (model_name: codex-agent). Three environment blockers fixed along the way: - OpenAI geo-blocks this host (403 unsupported_country_region_territory). Both containers now egress via the host xray proxy, with NO_PROXY keeping MCP and *.alogins.net traffic off the tunnel. - node:22-slim ships no system CA store; the Rust codex binary validates TLS against it, so every HTTPS call failed with a generic transport error while Node's own fetch worked. ca-certificates added to both images. - `codex exec resume` rejects -C/--cd (plain `codex exec` accepts it), which broke follow-up turns while first turns succeeded. Known regression: Kimi's managed-usage API has no Codex equivalent, so the /usage route returns 501 and there is no quota probe for the codex model. The two quota plugins degrade quietly to no output. Also: stop tracking cognee.env (live LLM + JWT secrets) and gitignore it. The secrets remain in earlier history and should be rotated. Verified live: plain turn, SSE streaming, session resume, MCP tool call, bearer-token MCP call, and completions through both LiteLLM routes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014Y5QPagv4iun1ghpwM96Ff
314 lines
14 KiB
Python
Executable File
314 lines
14 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""validate_capability_grants — kb#147 (A2A-15), extended by kb#144 (A2A-12):
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cross-check that agent-registry.yaml's declared tool_allowlist.mcp_servers
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(server-level) AND tool_allowlist.mcp_tool_filter (per-tool level, kb#144)
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for each agent match what that agent's real, git-controlled config actually
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grants it -- at BOTH layers that materialize a tool bundle for Adolf:
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1. OpenClaw's own mcp.servers.*.toolFilter.include in adolf/openclaw.json
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(adolf's own MCP client surface).
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2. shared-mcp.json's per-server `enabledTools` (kb#144 verification pass,
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2026-07-22): what adolf-llm/server.js's writeMcpConfig() seeds into
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each Kimi CLI session's project-root .mcp.json -- the layer that
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ACTUALLY determines the MODEL's tool bundle for Adolf's kimi backbone.
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Layer 1 alone shipped a false "Done" once already (kb#144 first pass):
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wire.jsonl proved Kimi's tool counts were unchanged because OpenClaw's
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toolFilter never reaches the Kimi CLI, which reads its own
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enabledTools/disabledTools (McpServerCommonFields, computeEnabledNames
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-- confirmed by decompiling the installed @moonshot-ai/kimi-code
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package's dist/main.mjs). Checking only layer 1 would pass this
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validator while leaving the real per-turn token bloat unfixed again.
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Read-only. Makes no live changes and touches no running service — it just
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diffs already-committed files so a registry edit that silently drifts from
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an agent's real config fails loudly (exit 1) instead of rotting quietly,
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which is exactly the "scattered configs" failure mode kb#147's acceptance
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bar ("grants live in the agent registry, not scattered configs") exists to
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prevent. kb#144's acceptance bar ("Adolf's tools are sourced from the
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registry") means both layers, not just the one OpenClaw itself reads.
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Only agents with a `prompt_source` pointing at a real openclaw.json-shaped
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config are checked; agents that are registry-only target state (torgash,
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researcher — no config file exists yet) are reported as skipped, not failed.
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Usage:
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./validate_capability_grants.py
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./validate_capability_grants.py --openclaw-json ../adolf/openclaw.json --id adolf
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"""
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import argparse
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import json
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import re
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import sys
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import agent_registry as ar
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HERE_ADOLF_OPENCLAW_JSON = "../adolf/openclaw.json"
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SHARED_MCP_JSON = "shared-mcp.json"
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# id -> path to the git-controlled OpenClaw config that IS this agent's live
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# MCP surface. Only adolf has one today (claude-coder has no openclaw.json --
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# it's a CLAUDE.md-driven persona, not an OpenClaw runtime; see its
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# capability_grant note in agent-registry.yaml).
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KNOWN_CONFIGS = {
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"adolf": HERE_ADOLF_OPENCLAW_JSON,
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}
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# id -> path to the shared-mcp.json this agent's backbone runtime seeds its
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# session .mcp.json from (kb#144 layer-2 check, see module docstring). Only
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# agents on a Kimi-CLI-shaped backbone go through this file at all.
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KNOWN_SHARED_MCP = {
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"adolf": SHARED_MCP_JSON,
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}
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def _strip_jsonc_comments(text):
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"""Drop // line comments. Good enough for this read-only check: this
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file's comments are all on their own line or trail real content with no
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'//' inside a string value today -- verified by hand."""
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out = []
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for line in text.splitlines():
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stripped = line.strip()
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if stripped.startswith("//"):
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continue
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m = re.search(r'(?<!:)//', line)
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if m and line[: m.start()].count('"') % 2 == 0:
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line = line[: m.start()]
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out.append(line)
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return "\n".join(out)
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def _find_key_brace(text, key, start=0):
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"""Find `key: {` (bare or quoted key) at or after `start`; return the
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index of the matching '{'."""
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m = re.search(rf'["\']?{re.escape(key)}["\']?\s*:\s*\{{', text[start:])
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if not m:
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raise ValueError(f"key {key!r} not found from offset {start}")
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return start + m.end() - 1 # index of the '{' itself
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def _matching_close_brace(text, open_idx):
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depth = 0
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for i in range(open_idx, len(text)):
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if text[i] == '{':
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depth += 1
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elif text[i] == '}':
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depth -= 1
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if depth == 0:
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return i
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raise ValueError("unbalanced braces")
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def _extract_object_top_level_keys(text, key_path):
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"""openclaw.json is JS-object-literal JSON5 (bare identifier keys,
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trailing commas) -- `json.loads` can't touch it and pulling in a JSON5
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parser is overkill for one narrow read. Instead: locate `key_path`
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(e.g. ["mcp", "servers"]) by finding each key's opening '{' in turn, then
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brace-depth-scan that object collecting only its DIRECT child keys
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(`name: {` at depth 1). Sufficient and honest for this validation
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script's one job; not a general JSON5 reader."""
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pos = 0
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open_idx = 0
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for key in key_path:
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open_idx = _find_key_brace(text, key, pos)
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pos = open_idx + 1
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close_idx = _matching_close_brace(text, open_idx)
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body = text[open_idx + 1 : close_idx]
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# Depth-0 identifiers immediately followed by ": {" are this object's
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# direct child keys (mcp.servers' entries are always objects). Only try
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# a key match right after a boundary ('{', ',', or start-of-body) so an
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# identifier can't be "matched" starting mid-token from inside a nested
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# value (the earlier, buggy version of this scanner did exactly that).
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keys = []
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depth = 0
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i, n = 0, len(body)
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prev_boundary = True
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key_re = re.compile(r'["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)["\']?\s*:\s*\{')
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while i < n:
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ch = body[i]
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if ch in ' \t\r\n':
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i += 1
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continue
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if depth == 0 and prev_boundary:
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m = key_re.match(body, i)
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if m:
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keys.append(m.group(1))
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i = m.end() - 1 # land on the key's '{' so the normal handling below opens depth 1
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prev_boundary = False
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continue
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if ch == '{':
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depth += 1
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prev_boundary = True
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elif ch == '}':
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depth -= 1
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prev_boundary = True
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elif ch == ',':
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prev_boundary = True
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else:
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prev_boundary = False
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i += 1
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return sorted(keys)
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def load_mcp_servers(path):
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with open(path) as f:
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raw = f.read()
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text = _strip_jsonc_comments(raw)
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return _extract_object_top_level_keys(text, ["mcp", "servers"])
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def _locate_object(text, key_path, start=0):
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"""Chase `key_path` (e.g. ["mcp", "servers", "hindsight"]) through nested
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`key: {` objects, same navigation _extract_object_top_level_keys does
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internally, exposed standalone so other extractors (toolFilter below)
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can reuse it instead of re-deriving brace offsets."""
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pos = start
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open_idx = start
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for key in key_path:
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open_idx = _find_key_brace(text, key, pos)
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pos = open_idx + 1
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close_idx = _matching_close_brace(text, open_idx)
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return open_idx, close_idx
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def _matching_close_bracket(text, open_idx):
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"""Same brace-depth-scan as _matching_close_brace, for '[' / ']' — needed
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to bound a toolFilter.include array (a list, not an object)."""
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depth = 0
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for i in range(open_idx, len(text)):
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if text[i] == '[':
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depth += 1
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elif text[i] == ']':
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depth -= 1
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if depth == 0:
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return i
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raise ValueError("unbalanced brackets")
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def load_tool_filter(path, server_name):
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"""kb#144: extract mcp.servers.<server_name>.toolFilter.include as a
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sorted list of tool names, or None if that server has no toolFilter (or
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no include list) at all — OpenClaw's own semantics for "no toolFilter":
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every tool the server offers stays eligible (see schema-BqdpWz19.js:
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"When omitted, all server tools remain eligible unless excluded.").
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exclude-only filters are not modeled here (none of Adolf's servers use
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exclude today) and are reported as None (unrestricted) rather than
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silently mis-parsed.
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"""
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with open(path) as f:
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raw = f.read()
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text = _strip_jsonc_comments(raw)
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try:
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server_open, server_close = _locate_object(text, ["mcp", "servers", server_name])
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except ValueError:
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return None # server not present in this config at all
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body = text[server_open : server_close + 1]
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try:
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tf_open, tf_close = _locate_object(body, ["toolFilter"])
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except ValueError:
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return None # no toolFilter -> unrestricted, by OpenClaw's own semantics
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tf_body = body[tf_open : tf_close + 1]
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m = re.search(r'["\']?include["\']?\s*:\s*\[', tf_body)
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if not m:
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return None # exclude-only or empty toolFilter -- not modeled, treat as unrestricted
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bracket_open = tf_body.index('[', m.start())
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bracket_close = _matching_close_bracket(tf_body, bracket_open)
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arr_body = tf_body[bracket_open + 1 : bracket_close]
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return sorted(re.findall(r'["\']([A-Za-z0-9_.\-\*]+)["\']', arr_body))
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def load_shared_mcp_enabled_tools(path):
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"""kb#144 layer-2 check (see module docstring): shared-mcp.json is
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strict JSON (no JSON5 quirks, unlike openclaw.json), so a plain
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`json.load` is enough -- no brace-scanner needed here. Returns
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{server_name: sorted-tool-list-or-None}, None meaning no `enabledTools`
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key on that server (unfiltered -- every tool it offers stays eligible,
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same "omitted = unrestricted" semantics as OpenClaw's own toolFilter).
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"""
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with open(path) as f:
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data = json.load(f)
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out = {}
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for name, cfg in (data.get("mcpServers") or {}).items():
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tools = cfg.get("enabledTools")
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out[name] = sorted(tools) if tools else None
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return out
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def main():
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ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
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ap.add_argument("--registry", default=None)
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ap.add_argument("--openclaw-json", default=None, help="override path for --id's config")
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ap.add_argument("--id", default=None, help="only this agent id (default: every id in KNOWN_CONFIGS)")
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args = ap.parse_args()
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reg = ar.load_registry(args.registry)
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ids = [args.id] if args.id else list(KNOWN_CONFIGS)
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failures = 0
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for agent_id in ids:
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agent = ar.get_agent(reg, agent_id)
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declared = sorted((agent.get("tool_allowlist") or {}).get("mcp_servers") or [])
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config_path = args.openclaw_json or KNOWN_CONFIGS.get(agent_id)
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if not config_path:
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print(f"SKIP {agent_id}: no known live config to cross-check (target-state agent)")
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continue
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try:
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live = load_mcp_servers(config_path)
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except FileNotFoundError:
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print(f"SKIP {agent_id}: config not found at {config_path}")
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continue
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if declared == live:
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print(f"OK {agent_id}: registry tool_allowlist.mcp_servers == live {config_path} mcp.servers -> {live}")
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else:
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failures += 1
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print(f"FAIL {agent_id}: registry says {declared} but {config_path} actually grants {live}")
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# kb#144: per-tool cross-check, same idea one level down. Only
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# meaningful for servers the registry actually declares a filter
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# for (mcp_tool_filter); a server absent from that map is not
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# asserted either way here (it may be intentionally unfiltered).
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declared_filters = (agent.get("tool_allowlist") or {}).get("mcp_tool_filter") or {}
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for server_name, declared_tools in declared_filters.items():
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live_tools = load_tool_filter(config_path, server_name)
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declared_sorted = sorted(declared_tools) if declared_tools else None
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if declared_sorted == live_tools:
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shown = live_tools if live_tools is not None else "(unfiltered)"
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print(f"OK {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter == live toolFilter.include -> {shown}")
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else:
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failures += 1
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print(f"FAIL {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter says {declared_sorted} but live toolFilter.include is {live_tools}")
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# kb#144 layer-2: the file that actually reaches the MODEL for a
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# Kimi-backed agent (see module docstring for why layer 1 alone
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# missed the real bug once already). Servers the registry declares a
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# filter for but that don't appear in shared-mcp.json at all (e.g.
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# marketplace, which OpenClaw carries but Kimi's session never sees)
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# are not asserted here -- that's a separate, pre-existing gap
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# between what OpenClaw offers Adolf and what reaches Kimi, not a
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# drift this validator's job to catch.
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shared_mcp_path = KNOWN_SHARED_MCP.get(agent_id)
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if shared_mcp_path:
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try:
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live_shared = load_shared_mcp_enabled_tools(shared_mcp_path)
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except FileNotFoundError:
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print(f"SKIP {agent_id}: shared-mcp.json not found at {shared_mcp_path}")
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else:
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for server_name, declared_tools in declared_filters.items():
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if server_name not in live_shared:
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continue
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declared_sorted = sorted(declared_tools) if declared_tools else None
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live_tools = live_shared[server_name]
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if declared_sorted == live_tools:
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shown = live_tools if live_tools is not None else "(unfiltered)"
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print(f"OK {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter == live shared-mcp.json enabledTools -> {shown}")
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else:
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failures += 1
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print(f"FAIL {agent_id}/{server_name}: registry mcp_tool_filter says {declared_sorted} but shared-mcp.json enabledTools is {live_tools}")
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sys.exit(1 if failures else 0)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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main()
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